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The TDRSS Management Story
by Robert O. Aller
Former Associate Administrator, Office of Space Operations
NASA Headquarters
NASA initiated the Trackingand Data Relay
Satellite System (TDRSS) Program in 1973 to
acquire a new capability for tracking and data
acquisition from NASA spacecraft in low
Earth orbit through the use of data relay satel-
lites in geosynchronous orbit. The data relay
satellites would relay communications first
between user spacecraft and an Earth station
in the continental U.S., then to and from the
NASA mission control and data processing
centers. A principal objective was to provide
the almost continuous coverage of low-orbiting
spacecraft (including the Space Shuttle and
Spacelab), which is possible from a geosyn-
chronous orbit, contrasted with the limited
visibility of low-orbiting spacecraft provided
by the network of ground stations then in use.
Equally important was the need to meet re-
quirements for the very high data rates (50 to
250 megabytes per second) which were being
projected for Spacelab and the free-flyer,
Earth-observation satellites.
In the intervening years, the TDRSS program
evolved to become, from a program manage-
ment and contract management viewpoint,
one of the most complex and challenging pro-
grams in the NASA experience. Problems be-
gan with the approach taken in initiating and
implementing the program and with program-
matic actions stemming from that approach.
Other problems were caused by delays in
Shuttle launch availability, especially the ex-
tensive delay after the Inertial Upper Stage
(IUS) rocket failure in 1983 and the loss of
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite-2 (TDRS-2)
in the 1986 Challenger tragedy. Nonetheless,
problems were overcome through dedicated ef-
forts of both the government and industry
team members, and today, TDRSS stands as a
success story. The space-based tracking and
data acquisition network envisioned in the
early 1970s is now in place and is performing
well. NASA has received more data through
the TDRSS than through all ground tracking
and data systems worldwide since the initi-
ation of space activities. The support provided
to date to the Space Shuttle and Spacelab and
to free-flying spacecraft in Earth orbit has ful-
ly confirmed the operational concepts which
led to the initial approval of the program.
In this article, I will review the management
history of this program, revisit the contractual
and management problems encountered, and
present an assessment of the experiences
gained, to identify "lessons learned" which
may be of benefit to NASA in the planning and
management of programs of this nature in the
future.
The Program Start
As early as the late 1960s, NASA realized that
the ground network, even on an expanded and
upgraded basis, could not meet the technologi-
cal needs of the relatively near future. Data
rates were increasing beyond the capacity of
the network equipment and, moreover, the
necessary geographical dispersion of the sta-
tions had limited coverage of spacecraft data
transmissions to about 15 percent of the orbit
for most low Earth orbital spacecraft. It would
have been possible to upgrade the ground sta-
tion equipment to overcome the data rate defi-
ciency partially, but it would have been very
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costly to do so, and geographic expansion of
the system was impracticable if not impossi-
ble. NASA was already experiencing political
problems with certain ground stations located
in foreign countries. Even with augmenta-
tion, the need for almost continuous coverage
could not be realized.
If, on the other hand, NASA could develop a
tracking and data network system in geosyn-
chronous orbit, high data rate transmissions
could be received in real-time and relayed di-
rectly into a single ground station for about 85
percent of the time from all low Earth orbiting
spacecraft, thereby permitting most of the
ground-based network to be phased down. The
circumstances themselves led to the only prac-
ticable decision that NASA could make -- an
in-orbit tracking and data acquisition net-
work. This approach was supported by a num-
ber of conceptual design studies, both in-house
and contracted, to determine the feasibility of
such a system. By the mid-1970s when it was
necessary to make the final decision, it was
felt that the required technology was already
in hand.
The NASA budget environment was unusual-
ly constrained at that time. The costs of devel-
oping the Shuttle was devouring a major share
of the budget to the extent that it was difficult
to maintain a balanced space research and ap-
plications program. The TDRSS program was
first proposed to the Administrator as a con-
ventional NASA-developed and implemented
system. However, the Administrator was re-
luctant to commit the up-front funding which
would have been required for such a program,
feeling that the constrained NASA budget re-
sources should instead be reserved for the
Shuttle development and other space research
and development programs. TDRSS was view-
ed more as an operational support system, and
there were precedents for obtaining such ser-
vices from the private sector, such as the
NASA Communications Network (NASCOM)
for communications support of NASA flight
missions.
The Procurement Phase
In this environment, and after much discus-
sion within NASA and with Congressional
committees, the decision was made to acquire
the TDRSS capability from the private sector
under a long-term service arrangement rather
than to pursue a NASA-developed and owned
system. It was also felt that savings to NASA
could result if the contractors were permitted
to propose a shared-service system containing
separate commercial communications capacity
along with the required NASA communica-
tions capabilities. In either scenario, the con-
tractor was to design, finance, and build the
system to meet NASA performance specifica-
tions, and operate the system and provide ser-
vices to NASA over a 10-year period, with no
payments to be made to the contractor until
acceptable services actually began. All this on
a fixed-price contract basis! Such an arrange-
ment would allow the project to proceed on a
timely basis, and NASA could defer inclusion
of funds in its annual budget until it came
time to pay for the services, presumably after
Shuttle development had been completed.
Special legislation would be required to allow
NASA to incur a liability in the absence of ap-
propriated funds and so avoid violation of the
Anti-deficiency Act. With the concurrence of
the Congress, NASA planned to enter into this
off-budget financing arrangement, even
though it was totally alien to its normal mode
of doing business.
As it evolved, however, the prospective con-
tractors were not able to provide the multi-
million dollar funding for the project from
their corporate resources nor to obtain financ-
ing from the usual financial institutions. (Re-
member, this was before the days of "junk
bonds.") It had been assumed that a 10-year
NASA contract would be adequate security,
but the financial institutions would not pro-
vide loans without a "full faith and credit"
backing from the U.S. Government. NASA it-
self did not have authority to enter into such
an agreement; it would have required a state-
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merit from the Attorney General's office. How-
ever, at that time, an alternate financing ar-
rangement was suggested to NASA by a repre-
sentative of the Federal Financing Bank
(FFB), a component of the U.S. Treasury De-
partment. Under this arrangement, construc-
tion loans would be provided directly to the
contractor by the FFB, with NASA assuming
the role of guarantor of the loans. This had the
advantage to NASA of a lower interest rate on
the loans than would have been obtainable
through the commercial institutions, even
with "full faith and credit" backing.
The Request for Proposal (RFP) entailed the
development of a service and performance
specification rather than a design specifica-
tion. When services are acquired from the pri-
vate sector, the performance parameters of an
existing commercial system are already
known. It then becomes a matter of determin-
ing if the commercial service will fulfill the
government requirements. Here, however, it
was necessary for NASA to specify in advance
its own requirements as known or projected at
the time for the planned 10-year service peri-
od, and really extending for 13 years ahead
since it was expected that it would take about
three years to design and build the system. As
it turned out, some very important perfor-
mance needs were not fully recognized at the
time.
The RFP was issued in February 1975 for a
two-phase procurement. After final proposals
from two contractor teams were evaluated, the
contract was awarded in December 1976 to
Western Union Space Communications Com-
pany teamed with TRW and Harris Corpora-
tion, for development, implementation and op-
eration of the TDRSS for 10 years of service to
NASA. In addition, the space segment would
have systems capabilities for Western Union's
commercial satellite communication services,
thus constituting a shared system in what was
viewed as a joint venture with industry.
Problems and Their Solutions
The first major problems arose shortly after
the project was under way. Potentially severe
radio frequency interference, caused by high-
power radio frequency energy bursts originat-
ing in eastern Europe, appeared to make full
operation of the system questionable. The
problem needed immediate correction. The
RFP had specified performance criteria but
had not cited the specifics of the radio frequen-
cy operating environment; NASA had, at this
point, approved the contractor's proposed sys-
tem design; and, most troublesome of all, it
was a fixed-price contract.
Had this been the usual cost-plus-fixed-fee
contract for a government-owned system,
NASA would have been able to get involved in
the immediate system redesign, issue a
change order, and get the project moving with
a minimum of loss of time and with some con-
trol over cost. In this "hands-off," leased-
service mode, however, NASA was thrust into
an engineering situation completely foreign to
its culture. The project management office
had been staffed at a minimal level considered
appropriate for managing the service con-
tract, but clearly not adequate for the in-depth
technical design review and control of a con-
ventional NASA space systems procurement.
On the other side, Western Union, the prime
contractor, with its orientation toward com-
mercial communications services, had but lit-
tle aerospace systems development experience
or background; the subcontractor, TRW, had
this experience and knowledge, but was not
part of the NASA/contractor interface. Hin-
dered by limited contractor access and pre-
cluded by the contract from giving technical
direction, NASA became burdened with un-
seemly project delays and added expense. This
was only the first of many circumstantial
events that restricted NASA's ability to exer-




Technicians transfer the Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite and its Inertial Upper Stage, the primary
cargo for STS-6, into the transport canister.
Other engineering changes, particularly in
the ground station, resulted from new or
changing operational requirements. Some of
these came from the growing need for more
stringent communications security provisions
for the command and control systems. Usual-
ly, such changes to handle mission-unique re-
quirements had to be made on the contractor's
side of the system interface, a troublesome and
usually costly process under a fixed-price con-
tract.
The original contract contained provisions for
penalties to the contractor for failure to meet
specified levels of performance in the system.
These were intended to promote a systems de-
sign with sufficient redundancy to assure reli-
able operations. However, the contract cost
growth caused by engineering changes and re-
peated launch delays effectively eroded the
penalty provisions to the point where the con-
tractor would find it more cost-effective to
skimp on redundancy and reliability and in-
stead accept the risk of penalties for poor per-
formance. In the ground station in particular,
the contractor cut back significantly on the
level of redundancy and even on the level of
performance from the initial design proposal,
contending that this system would still meet
NASA's service specifications as given in the
RFP. This type of situation led to many dis-
agreements between NASA and the contrac-
tor, some of which had to be resolved by a
change order and additional costs.
Since TDRSS was a leased-service type of pro-
curement, it had not been subjected to the
same type of end-to-end systems engineering
analysis that would be normal in development
of a NASA space mission support system, and
the service and performance specifications ex-
pressed in the RFP did not bring forth a sys-
tem design flexible enough to accommodate
some of the changes in operational require-
ments.
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Another major problem arose from the inter-
dependency of the TDRSS Project with other
projects. The original schedule for launching
the first three TDRS spacecraft was based on
using the Atlas-Centaur, followed by the Shut-
tle/Spinning Solid Upper Stage-Atlas (SSUS-
A) combination. The SSUS-A was never actu-
ally produced, and instead, the Air Force's IUS
was selected for the upper stage launch. How-
ever, both the Shuttle and the IUS suffered
numerous delays. During the same period, ad-
ditional user requirements were placed on the
TDRS by the Shuttle and other programs that
necessitated major engineering changes to the
TDRSS data system. The repeated lengthy de-
lays inflicted severe damage on the potential
for commercial service envisioned by Western
Union, because service date plans for commer-
cial service could no longer be met.
At the same time, serious conflicting view-
points arose between NASA and Western
Union over many issues associated with the
shared system: cost allocations, impact of engi-
neering changes on schedules, priorities of
NASA requirements versus commercial re-
quirements, etc. The net result was that West-
ern Union and NASA reached agreement in
late 1982 for NASA to acquire rights to the
complete transponder system, including the
commercial capacity, bringing the joint ven-
ture to an end. This agreement also changed
the fixed-price arrangement of the operations
phase to a cost-plus-award-fee contract that
would allow much more flexibility for NASA.
The development and implementation phase
remained fixed-price.
By the time of the first launch in April 1983,
the project was more than three years behind
schedule. TDRS-1 was launched on the Shut-
tle with an IUS developed by the Air Force.
The IUS rocket motors failed to burn properly,
however, and injected the TDRS into an ellip-
tical orbit rather than into the desired geosta-
tionary orbit. Ironically, the fact that the
spacecraft had been designed for dual govern-
menffcommercial service saved the day. Us-
ing fuel ordinarily reserved for commercial
purposes, a team of government and contrac-
tor personnel devised a series of maneuvers ef-
fected with one-pound thrusters over the next
several months which placed the spacecraft
into its proper orbit. By December 31, the
TDRSS was declared to have begun providing
services. TDRS-1 has performed well since
that date, and has been joined in orbit recently
by two more TDR satellites to establish an
operational system.
The 'Lessons Learned' Workshop
With the publication of the Reagan Adminis-
tration Space Policy in 1988, a renewed em-
phasis was placed on the desire to commercial-
ize to the greatest extent certain new space
project undertakings. High-level discussions
between NASA officials and Administration
policy-level representatives confirmed the in-
tent of the Administration to move aggressive-
ly toward this manner of operation. Internal
discussions ensued at NASA, and we began a
serious review of upcoming programs to see
what might be done to respond to this new ini-
tiative.
One aspect of this review focused on the joint
venture between Western Union and NASA,
and on the leased-services approach to involve
the commercial sector in such a joint venture.
As a result, I felt that it would be useful to re-
visit the TDRSS experience to see what les-
sons might be learned that would assist us in
dealing with the commercialization program.
To that end, I called together about 30 present
and former NASA and industry people who
were closely involved in the development and
execution of the TDRSS project, to review its
successes and its problems, and to identify
"lessons learned." The major findings of the
group follow.
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LESSONS LEARNED
Shared Service Concept. The concept of
combining a commercial need with an estab-
lished NASA need is valid, and may offer sig-
nificant savings to the government through
shared costs; however, the rights and oper-
ational utilization needs, availability, and
privileges of each party must be clearly estab-
lished in advance.
The proportions of cost for the shared TDRSS
space segment was approximately 20 percent
for Western Union and 80 percent for NASA.
Under proper conditions, such an arrange-
ment could benefit both parties. In this case,
however, serious conflict of interest problems
arose over many elements of the program -- de-
sign changes, launch vehicle selections, and
delays in the launch dates. It was a situation
where the parties had different motivations:
NASA was concerned with assuring the most
effective performance for NASA missions,
while Western Union was driven by the neces-
sity to profit from communications services.
That this set of circumstances eventually led
to dissolution of the "partnership" does not di-
minish the possibility of shared service, but
does focus on the need for totally clear under-
standing from the beginning. The priority of
the government's service requirements must
be clearly set forth at the outset if that service
is critical to a government mission operation.
Leased-Service Concept. A leased-service
concept should be based on the use of available
commercial services or existing system technol-
ogy if service is mission-critical.
There was much more development required
for the design and implementation of this pro-
gram than had been apparent in the beginning
due, in great measure, to the changes in re-
quirements after the contract was in place.
The TDRS services were critical to NASA's
mission. With the realization that major
changes were required, NASA reacted by at-
tempting to influence the design to ensure via-
bility of the program purpose. The service-
level specification, however, did not permit
NASA to specify a design change; only a
change in service requirements could be initi-
ated under the contract. A very serious defi-
ciency of this arrangement was NASA's in-
ability to provide to the contractor specific ex-
perience in spacecraft and ground systems de-
sign, experience that could have benefited reli-
ability and performance issues.
Interdependency with Government-
provided Services. The interdependency of
government-provided services to the establish-
ment of a shared-lease service should be avoid-
ed or minimized to avoid government impact to
the enabling of the leased services.
The original contract specified that the first
three TDR satellites would be launched on
Atlas-Centaurs, which were, of course, fully
developed operational launch vehicles. The
next three TDR satellites would go on the
Shuttle/SSUS-A, later changed to the Shut-
tle/IUS, all of which were still under develop-
ment at the time of the contract.
However, early in the contract, the spacecraft
design was outgrowing the Atlas-Centaur load
capability. Spacecraft weight reductions could
be made only by unacceptable reductions in re-
dundancy and other reliability provisions, and
it soon became necessary to shift the first
three TDR satellites to the Shuttle/IUS. The
subsequent Shuttle and upper stage vehicle
development delays made it impossible to
maintain the program schedule, impacting the
Western Union commercial communications
as well as services to NASA. In agreeing to
provide launch services, NASA had, in effect,
become a subcontractor to its own prime con-
tractor for TDRSS services. This complex in-
terrelationship complicated the lines of re-
sponsibility, placed NASA directly in line to
the success of Western Union's efforts, and led




Fixed-price Contract for Developmental
Work. A fixed-price contract is not appropri-
ate for development of a mission-critical sup-
port system where significant technology devel-
opment may be required or where substantial
changes to requirements may occur.
The nature of the fixed-price contract made
close technical direction very difficult. The
contract specified certain services that were to
be provided; therefore, NASA could not read-
ily control the systems design or make
changes to it. Technical direction, as tradi-
tionally practiced by NASA, was not possible.
In addition, the project management structure
was inappropriate for what became a develop-
mental program. The prime contractor, West-
ern Union, had little background in the aero-
space technology necessary for a successful
project. Their subcontractors were TRW for
systems integration and Harris Corporation
for the ground station; Harris was also sepa-
rately a subcontractor to TRW to provide the
spacecraft antennas. The formal NASA-
contractor interface could not function in the
normal manner. This eventually led to an in-
formal interface between NASA engineers and
those of TRW and Harris, simply in the inter-
est of keeping the project moving.
changes. When the original basis for the pen-
alty clauses no longer existed, the contractor
was relatively free to take actions that might
reduce the level of service without incurring
undue monetary risk.
Operational Interface. In a fixed-price envi-
ronment, establish the government contractor
operational interface at a point where changes
in requirements affect only the government
side, so far as possible.
In developing the Request for Proposal for
TDRSS, the prime effort was to define service
capabilities that would meet the requirements
of future NASA missions in low Earth orbit.
The system was planned to have a broad enve-
lope of capabilities that would handle the pro-
jected needs of the users over the 10-year ser-
vice period without major changes to the sys-
tem. However, unanticipated changes in re-
quirements began to emerge soon after the
contract was in place. Efforts were made to
confine the impact of such changes to the
NASA side of the interface, and thereby not
perturb the fixed-price service contract. How-
ever, as this was often not practicable, con-
tract modifications then had to be made, par-
ticularly in the ground system, which had sig-
nificant cost as well as schedule impacts.
Government Control under Leased Ser-
vice. Under a leased-service arrangement,
NASA must accept some loss of control over
physical assets and accept risks of system out-
ages or failures.
Effective control of the TDRSS assets was in
the hands of Western Union as owner of the
system. Under such an arrangement, the only
way that NASA could influence the design of
the system and, in effect, the quality of ser-
vices was by specifying service requirements,
including penalty clauses to the contract for
failure of the contractor to provide the re-
quired services. In this particular case, the
penalty clauses were not fully effective, due to
inflation and NASA-induced technical
End-to-end Engineering and Operations
Analysis. In a leased-service approach to ob-
taining a mission support capability, it is just
as essential initially to establish a comprehen-
sive end-to-end systems engineering analysis
and an operations and testing plan as would be
done in a conventional NASA space system de-
velop men t p rogra m.
Probably because of the view of TDRSS as a
service procurement, there was not enough at-
tention given initially to a systems engineer-
ing approach for the total end-to-end system --
the Network Control Center, the Project Oper-
ations Control Centers, etc., as well as the
TDRSS. Operational concepts that would
have correlated the designs and the require-
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ments of all portions of the overall system
were not developed until late in the game. The
result was unnecessarily complex interfaces
among elements of the overall system which
might have been avoided by utilizing a sys-
tems engineering approach from the begin-
ning; in that way, operational concepts would
have been defined at an early stage.
Considerations for Prime Contractor. The
prime contractor must be one who has an exten-
sive background in the business at hand.
When the RFP was issued calling for a long-
term service, there appeared to be a perception
in the aerospace and communications indus-
tries that a communications carrier was the
proper type of company for the effort. The ini-
tial proposals received by NASA were in that
structure. It is quite possible that the initial
demands for capital to finance the project led
some to believe that only huge communi-
cations-oriented companies would be able to
fund such a venture. Regardless of the moti-
vation, the prime contractor's limited expo-
sure to aerospace systems technology was not
sufficient for sound technical management of
the contract. NASA is more accustomed to
dealing with aerospace firms in terms of sys-
tem and subsystem design. As the technical
problems in the system grew, NASA often
tended to bypass the prime contractor and
work directly with the subs to resolve the tech-
nical problems. Thus, de facto decisions were
frequently made that had not flowed through
the appropriate management channels.
Conclusion
The TDRSS leased-service approach was de-
signed to involve the commercial sector (i.e., a
contractor) in developing and implementing a
new mission support capability for NASA.
This approach used contractor funding, with
costs to be amortized and reimbursed to the
contractor over a 10-year operations period.
Thus, NASA budget requirements for this ca-
pability would be deferred until the service
was actually provided. As it turned out, the
Federal Financing Bank became the source of
funding, with NASA guaranteeing the repay-
ment to the Bank. This was to NASA's advan-
tage since the loans were obtained at a consid-
erably lower interest rate than would have
been otherwise available to the private con-
tractor. Budget requirements for the system
were deferred from the start of the contract in
January 1977 until repayment to the Bank be-
gan in late 1983. From a management point of
view, this arrangement was not a problem for
NASA to administer.
Unfortunately, this all took place during a pe-
riod of high inflation and unprecedented rises
in interest rates -- from 7.5% planned to a peak
of nearly 16%. These effects, coupled with the
repeated delays in Shuttle and IUS availabil-
ity, caused serious cost growth; almost half of
the present total systems cost is in interest
charges. However, the cost of these interest
charges now appearing as NASA direct costs
would not have appeared in the NASA budget
had the project been funded in the convention-
al manner. Instead, the interest costs would
have been included in the Treasury budget as
part of the cost of financing government bor-
rowing.
The TDRSS will end its sixth year of service on
December 31, 1989. Even with only one satel-
lite in operation from December 1983 until
late 1988, the service provided was far superi-
or to that provided by the network of ground
stations. With the launch of the third satellite
in March 1989, the system is now considered
operational, and will service NASA's data ac-
quisition requirements into the early phase of
Space Station Freedom. In 1991, a replace-
ment satellite will be launched to replace the
first satellite in the system. At this point,
NASA has achieved what it set out to do -- in-
stall an in-orbit tracking data acquisition sys-
tem providing 85 percent coverage for all low
Earth-orbiting spacecraft, leading to the clos-
ing of all but a few ground stations.
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This double exposure by photographer Klaus Wilkins
uses trick photography to cause the TRW Tracking Data
and Relay System Satellite to appear to be inside the
cargo bay of the orbiter Challenger at the Complex 39A
launch site.
We are now approaching the next generation
of TDRSS operations -- an advanced TDRSS
that will meet the requirements of future mis-
sions in the late 1990s and on into the next
century. This undertaking attests to the va-
lidity of the operational concepts that began
nearly 20 years ago. It has been a challenge to
reach this point, and we must now use some of
the "lessons learned" through this experience
to help us cope with the problems that we are
sure to face in the development of this next
generation of space network systems, as well
as other government procurements.
ORIGINAL PAGE
BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPH
9
Project Management and People
by William R. Marshall
Retired Manager, Shuttle Projects Office
Marshall Space Flight Center
These days a project manager can easily be-
come so bogged down in the details and inter-
ruptions of scheduling, costs, and resolution of
technical problems that it is easy to forget that
people are an integral part of the total equa-
tion. One of the manager's primary responsi-
bilities to employees is to motivate them.
Motivation is no easy task. A motivated em-
ployee works to get the job done; not just to
earn a paycheck. The manager's responsibil-
ity is to create the conditions that will lead the
employees to want to do their jobs.
A motivated employee, by definition, has a
sense of pride and self-worth. The manager
can help to instill these qualities in three basic
ways: by setting an example, by demonstrat-
ing understanding, and by recognizing the em-
ployee's accomplishments.
Setting an Example
An effective manager leads by example. En-
thusiasm about the projects undertaken,
steady and effective work habits, and support
of the employees in their efforts to support the
project, lead to effective work.
A corollary of leading by example is informal
communication. The manager must keep in
touch with the employees. The manager
should practice MBWA: Management By
Wandering About. By spending time with the
employees, informally, the manager will be
aware of what they are doing and what their
problems are before the problems become big.
The manager will be available to them when
they have ideas and new solutions to problems
that arise, and will be more receptive to their
input into the projects they are all working on
together. This informal give and take gives
the employees a sense of teamwork, of owner-
ship of the projects, and reinforces their sense
of pride and self-worth, or motivation.
The wandering about technique was applied
by J.R. Thompson when he assumed the Cen-
ter Director position at Marshall Space Flight
Center. Immediately, employees began to re-
spond throughout the Center organization
with more informal communications which
multiplied the data exchange between ele-
ments by an order of magnitude -- or more.
This approach did not change the need for for-
real communication, but multiplied the total
exchange of information and improved effi-
ciency.
The manager must be careful, however, to
maintain a balance in this system of informal
communication. Management must continue
to set an example and to exercise leadership,
and to walk the fine line between informality
and comradeship on one hand and formality
and team effectiveness on the other. Should
the manager make a mistake, the manager
will be able to recognize it, admit it to the
team, take full responsibility for it, and correct
it. Should one of the team members make a
mistake, it will be caught and rectified before
it causes a disproportional problem.
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Demonstrating Understanding
Thirty years ago, Douglas McGregor put for-
ward two opposing theories of management,
called Theory X and Theory Y. Theory X de-
scribes people as lazy and irresponsible, and
professes that they need to be manipulated,
controlled, and threatened in order for them to
accomplish anything. They need a sense of or-
der, control (from above), and security. Theory
Y says that people have an innate sense of re-
sponsibility, that they naturally want to work
and to work well, and that they do best when
given challenges to their ingenuity and cre-
ativity. Actually, people tend to respond to the
way they are treated. If their management ex-
pects them to be unmotivated and lazy and im-
poses restrictions to their freedom, then the
employees are likely to become unmotivated
and lazy. If, on the other hand, the manager
demonstrates the expectation that the employ-
ees will be as dedicated and as motivated as
management, they will be enthusiastic and
proud to be working on the team.
Part of demonstrating understanding of em-
ployees is knowing their individual strengths
and weaknesses, and knowing how to take ad-
vantage of the strengths. Ideally, the man-
ager will be able to match each employee ex-
actly to a specific job; if that is not possible,
perhaps the job can be altered to fit the indi-
vidual strengths and skills of the employee.
The results of this understanding are more
feeling of accomplishment on the part of the
employee and smoother, more effective func-
tioning of the team as a whole.
When new employees are hired, it is not al-
ways immediately apparent from their work
history what their special skills are. The ideal
solution to the problem of where to place them
on the team is to offer a rotating series of as-
signments at first, with immediate assessment
of performance in each. After that, the new
hire can be placed in the most challenging and
most effective slot.
All new employees at Marshall Space Flight
Center are on a rotational assignment for one
year. They are placed in three or more organi-
zations during this time, and both manage-
ment and they select a "best fit" at the end of
this assignment. Many new hires do not re-
turn to the organization that interviewed and
hired them, a sure indication that rotation
throughout the organization may provide a
better fit for employees and the organization.
To ensure that employees are successful con-
tributors to the project, the program, and the
organization, the manager is responsible for
good, clear communication. The manager
must make individual work assignments
clear, show the employees how their activities
contribute to the organization's goals, direct
their activities insofar as necessary, and pro-
vide them with adequate tools and the proper
environment for their jobs.
A good manager will take the risk of reposi-
tioning current employees to build the future
of both the employees and the organization.
The manager is responsible for the employees'
success. Perpetuating the status quo of the or-
ganization, while it is comfortable, can lead to
stagnation of both employees and organiza-
tion. Taking the risk of moving people around
is a sign of an innovative and progressive
manager, and, done intelligently, results in in-
creased productivity for the organization and
greater job satisfaction for the employee. The
manager who knows the employees and their
individual capabilities will be able to do this
intelligently and successfully. Often the man-
ager can recognize employees' strengths and
potential better than the employees do them-
selves.
After the Challenger accident, the manager of
the Space Shuttle Main Engine research and
development efforts was requested to assume
responsibility for the Flight Engine operation.
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This did not fit the manager's development
background and was accepted only after con-
siderable persuasion. Within 18 months, the
manager had praise for his supervisor's judg-
ment of his capabilities and appreciated the
new assignment.
Recognizing Accomplishments
The usual way to recognize outstanding per-
formance in the workplace is by promotion and
increase in salary. In some instances, particu-
larly at NASA, such rewards are not an op-
tion, because the employee has "topped out,"
or there is simply no slot available to advance
into. In those cases, it becomes necessary to
discover other ways to recognize an employee's
accomplishments and provide the feeling of
upward movement. NASA frequently does
this with awards and special recognition. A
manager can supplement this with additional,
interesting assignments, or with organization-
al "perks."
Effective recognition is also personal. The
day-to-day smile, pat on the back, encouraging
word, or phone call to express appreciation for
a job well done works wonders for an employ-
ee's morale. Say thank you. Of course, the
employee is just doing the job, but the personal
additional recognition aids in fueling ongoing
motivation.
Recognition consists of both example and un-
derstanding, and is thus arguably the most
important of the triad. Recognition is the
manager's most powerful motivational tool.
Management is ultimately responsible for the
success of the project, the program, and the or-
ganization. Effective managers are effective
leaders. Good managers grow through exper-
ience, education, and common sense.
NEWMAN'S LAWS
The length of the justification varies inversely to the dollars involved.
Corollary: The significance of an item is inversely proportional to the number
of words it takes to describe it.
The more elaborate the cover the less accurate the contents.
The probability of creative innovation varies inversely with the
refinement of the procedures.
You can't hold a staff meeting without a staff.
Corollary: You can't supervise them if you can't find them.
Newman's law of celestial mechanics: The last acceptable launch
window for any given planetary mission is the one we are trying to get
in the budget.
-- E. Thomas Newman
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Managing Projects -- An Industry View
by S.Z. Rubenstein
President, Advanced Systems Strategic Defense Center
Rockwell International
The project manager is the leader of a team of
people charged with converting a broad set of
mission objectives into an operating system.
Project management is the set of principles
and processes used by a team to manage a pro-
ject from its birth to the end of its life cycle.
These principles and processes encompass all
the skills needed to plan, organize, direct,
staff, and control the project. My comments in
this article are based on nearly 30 years of ex-
perience in industry serving a variety of cus-
tomers, including NASA, DoD, other govern-
ment agencies, and industrial and commercial
end users. My examples are drawn from the
Space Shuttle project.
Essential Concepts:
Dynamic Process, Committed People,
Communications
Today's manager must thoroughly grasp these
three concepts -- have a working knowledge of
them -- in order to successfully run a major
project.
First, project management is a dynamic
process. Managers operate in an environ-
ment where priorities shift and decision crite-
ria change as a project progresses. Technology
progress usually occurs differently than
planned: funds are being expended, new peo-
ple are coming aboard, and schedule commit-
ment dates are coming closer. As a project
gains momentum, it becomes harder and hard-
er to shift direction and increasingly more im-
portant to make timely decisions.
Second, project success is achieved
through the hard work of committed peo-
ple. They are willing to overcome the hurdles,
surprises, changes, problems, and heartbreaks
that occur during project life. These people
can be found at every level: on the factory
floor, at the engineering workstation, in the
schedule control office, at the shipping desk, in
the launch Center, at mission control, in the
controller's office, in the program office, with-
in the congressional staff, and also within the
executive offices. It takes committed people
from all functions within all involved organi-
zations to ensure that a project stays within
performance, cost, and schedule commitments.
Third, communicating relevant informa-
tion about the project -- upwards, side-
ways, and downwards -- is the cohesion
that keeps the total team in a consistent di-
rection. Information needs are different at
each level of the project organization. Infor-
mation needs at Headquarters to support a de-
cision made by Congress on future funding are
different than those of a Center project man-
ager to support a decision on the allocation of
resources among project elements. Still differ-
ent are the needs of an industry line manager
to support a decision on staffing for a six-
month period, or a subcontract manager to al-
locate resources among companies. We often
make the faulty assumption that all those in-
volved in the project know what is going on.
Communicating relevant information, either
on project status or sharing a problem, is a
principal mechanism for ensuring that the
project will be successful.
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However, before discussion of dynamic pro-
cess, committed people, and communicating
relevant information it is further necessary to
understand two related subjects: quality and
requirements.
Understanding Quality: An Attitude
Quality as a concept is often misunderstood.
The contemporary definition is "meeting the
requirements established for the system." For
example, the functional requirements at the
system level, specifications at the end-item
level, the inspection process at the manufac-
turing level, and documentation at the test
level are all requirements to be met.
Confusion often arises among the concepts of
quality, safety and reliability, and product as-
surance. In both manned and unmanned
space systems, stringent requirements are es-
tablished for safety and reliability on the basis
of the consequences of losing the payload or
the launch vehicle. However, safety and reli-
ability are similar to other performance re-
quirements, although their priority in the re-
quirements tree might be quite high. Similar-
ly, a set of requirements is established for the
processes needed to implement product assur-
ance. Quality, in my view, is an attitude of
commitment to perform to those requirements.
In systems design, development, and oper-
ations, requirements are established to ensure
a system will do its intended job. Therefore, no
compromise is made with respect to quality. If
the system does not meet its requirements,
then either it must be fixed or the requirement
re-examined and changed to fit the behavior of
the built system, if its intended job can still be
performed. Although this might seem to be an
extremely expensive way to operate, it is my
experience that meeting the requirements or
equivalently building a quality system is most
cost-effective. The issue is making sure the re-
quirements are correct; there are no options on
quality. There is no substitute for producing a
system that will do the intended job.
Understanding Requirements:
The Foundation
When a project is initiated, the manager has
three available resources: the mission objec-
tives; the current state of the art technology
(in its broadest sense -- tools, devices, standard
specifications, and processes); and collective
past experience. Very often, the mission ob-
jectives are a mixture of requirements and de-
sign. The state of the art of technology weaves
its way into the requirements by the fact that
many requirements are, in reality, point solu-
tions rather than statements of the problem.
Past experience is very valuable when proper-
ly used, but all too often we embed require-
ments that solve a problem no longer relevant
to the one at hand. These distortions of true
requirements can limit our ability to use tech-
nology advances creatively.
An essential task for the project management
team is to ensure that requirements are pre-
cise and operationally valid and that sufficient
time is allowed to iterate them in order to as-
sure the simplest implementation. Require-
ments imposing unneeded constraints and un-
necessary complication must be changed. In
the ideal world, the "systems engineering pro-
cess" should ensure that this task is completed
before full-scale development begins. Since
this does not always happen, it pays to scrub
the requirements hard at the beginning, be-
fore trouble occurs, rather than wait for a cri-
sis. I can guarantee that there will be many
occasions to review the requirements during
the life of the project.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM
THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
The Space Shuttle program was unique in that
only a very few key personnel changes oc-
curred from the start of development in 1972
until first flight in 1981. This was true for
NASA, at Headquarters and the Centers, and
for the prime contractors. Most projects, how-
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ever, see a greater turnover during a develop-
ment period as long as this. This particular
group of people also had some unique shared
experiences, having come through the Moon
landing program and the Skylab program to-
gether. Many of the people were also involved
in the earlier Phases A and B (conceptual and
design) studies and had participated in a very
large number of trade studies, from configura-
tion to technology to ground support concepts.
My experience did not include the early pro-
grams or trades; and as I started on the Shut-
tle, I felt as if I were jumping aboard a racing
train. As soon as I became involved in the
decision-making process, it became apparent
that external ground rules and constraints
were changing, that resources needed to be
shifted, and that many of the technology
choices would have to be re-examined. The
project stayed at this pace throughout the de-
velopment cycle. Further, it was a resource-
constrained program, constantly trading
schedule for current dollars -- similar to many
of today's programs. I will review some of the
situations that occurred during the Shuttle de-
velopment and extract some beneficial lessons.
Requirements and Early Design. During
the early design phase, there is constant
pressure to meet drawing release schedules;
often mistakes can be made by releasing
drawings before an adequate number of design
iterations occurs. On the Shuttle project,
experienced designers often withstood these
pressures and ensured that their designs
would meet performance requirements while
staying within cost and schedule constraints.
Sometimes -- due to pressure or inexperience --
they did not achieve this balance, for there is a
fine line between being ready to release and
embellishing the design.
The biggest payoff for reducing cost and
improving operating characteristics occurs in
the early design cycle. Current concepts, such
as "Simultaneous Engineering" and "Total
Quality Management," involve the total team
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(engineering, manufacturing, test, logistics,
etc.) early in the design cycle. The objective of
these concepts is to simplify the total
production process, recognizing the value of
design iterations.
The Space Shuttle Discovery final assembly and
installation operations took place at Palmdale, CA.
The system implementation is reflected in a
series of plans, i.e., engineering, software, pro-
curement, quality assurance, manufacturing,
etc. As iterations are made to improve perfor-
mance, cost, and/or schedule, these plans must
be kept in step. Early attention to long-lead
items, critical processes, facilities tooling, and
test needs will prevent future problems. These
plans, when properly formulated, are the
means to communicate direction to the project
team and measure project progress. As a proj-
ect manager, one must keep the pace moving
quickly. One must always balance schedule
pressure, the quality of the technical output,
the implementation risk, and cost.
Mid-course Correction. The time span from
preliminary design review (PDR) to critical
design review (CDR) varies from project to
project. It is a period of significant change: ex-
penditures are increasing as prototypes and
breadboards point to the need for technical
changes. Often annual funding limits and oth-
er external events result in considerable
schedule pressure, causing severe competition
for funds among project elements. As project
manager, one almost has to anticipate where
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the problems will arise and be prepared to
make adjustments. Problems can take the
form of schedule, dollar, design, or require-
ments changes.
During this period, there is time to change the
implementation characteristics of the system.
However, project managers should ensure that
the data they are receiving are real (i.e., they
must spend time visiting the development con-
tractors -- within the company and at subcon-
tractor and associate contractor sites). When
these implementing organizations understand
the need, the project manager will find that
their ability to react to change is far better
than either might think. Not making a deci-
sion to adjust can be far worse than a non-
optimal decision. Conversely, constant
changes can result in chaos. It takes a sea-
soned team to make the right decisions and
maintain configuration control.
find that all the scheduled tasks do not have to
be completed in exactly the sequence specified.
There is considerable independent parallel ac-
tivity off the critical path. With proper contin-
gency planning, a responsive organization,
and timely decision-making, performance re-
quirements can still be met within cost and
schedule commitments.
The Build Cycle. In the ideal world, produc-
tion fabrication occurs only after the design is
thoroughly reviewed, all parts function as
specified and are received on time, all software
is received on time and perfectly matches the
hardware, all subassembly qualifications are
complete, all assembly and installation pro-
cesses are perfect, and the expenditures of
those functions that have finished their work
are rapidly decreasing. In the real world, this
rarely occurs.
Hopefully, the requirements cycle has pro-
duced good paper specifications and processes,
and the quality attitude of meeting require-
ments is well established. If not, the project
manager is operating on quicksand -- this is
not the time to find out one has missed some
critical mission objective. The responsiveness
of the project management team is critical
during this period. Resources almost always
need balancing to meet the real rate of
progress. The project rarely has adequate fi-
nancial reserves to cover every problem, and
manpower reserves to meet every contingency.
However, at this time, the manager will also
ORIGINAL PAGE
Performance of the Space Shuttle's thermal protection
system has exceeded expectations.
I well remember deciding to scrap a marginal
lot of strain isolation pads (SIPs) used in bond-
ing the thermal protective tiles to the Shuttle
vehicle. During screening tests, it appeared
that 1 to 3 percent of this lot was bad. There
was enough SIP material to install at least
1,000 tiles, and this obviously would mean
that 10 to 30 tiles might not have the proper
strength. The post-installation tile acceptance
tests would probably catch the bulk of the
problem. However, manufacturing and mate-
rial people developed a workaround plan that
allowed us to wait for a new lot with minimal
schedule impact to the total vehicle flow. We
chose to wait. We updated our process specifi-
cations at the supplier and at our factory to
eliminate the possibility of problem reoccur-
rence. We set the example to our floor person-
nel that we would accept no less than a quality
product. And as a result, the thermal protec-
tion system on the orbiter has performed well,
even better than expected.
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Qualification and Preparing for Flight.
One of the least understood risks in project
management is caused by lack of attention to
the acceptance and qualification testing re-
quired to prepare for both flight testing and
operations. Too often, proper resource alloca-
tion in this phase is neglected. (This means
too little as well as too much.) Each of the
technical disciplines seems to have its own cri-
teria as to what needs to be proved by test ver-
sus how much can be proved by analysis.
Cryogenic and hypergolic devices always seem
to provide test surprises. For the Shuttle pro-
gram, simulation of complete structural loads
(including the thermal, vibroacoustic, and me-
chanical acceleration loads) was very difficult.
Software and avionics integrated testing is al-
ways questioned relative to its completeness.
(Are all the possible cases covered, including
the fault conditions?) Testing to prove life lim-
its can become very expensive, if not impracti-
cal. (Consider proving 10- or 30-year life with
adequate margins.) The physical size of an
end item and its operational modes (i.e., is it
reusable, does it have asymmetrical orienta-
tions?) will determine whether environment
test chambers can be used.
Six major steps a project leader can take to
minimize such risks are: (1) include seasoned
test personnel on the project team; (2) consider
the test requirements early in the project life;
(3) review the test requirements before testing
begins (e.g., testing gaseous oxygen flow con-
trol valves, tile test panels, and structural and
mechanical devices where the culprit was the
test requirement, test fixture, or procedure
rather than the device under test); (4) pay at-
tention to ground and flight test results -- es-
pecially where actual performance diverges
from predicted performance -- since these are
potential trouble spots; (5) be prepared to
make some tough decisions on the acceptabil-
ity of test results versus redesign and retrofit
versus limited life designation; and (6) not fly-
ing until problems that affect mission success
have been resolved.
Shuttle ground vibration test operations took place at the
Marshall Space Flight Center.
Operations. No matter how well one comes
through the previous phases, the operational
period will present some unique challenges.
Flight results, technology evolution,
turnaround improvements (if reusable), repair
and wearout, new missions, the desire for
increased performance, and the next version of
the system will demand additional effort.
Frequently, those who authorize additional
funds, be they Congress or Headquarters pro-
gram personnel, are not prepared to continue
investing during the program life. By this
point, the project team should have some prov-
en measures to judge the value of any change
to the system. Too often changes are made
without an operational set of priorities and the
result is that systems degrade in performance
rather than improve. The need for adequate
technical development, maintenance of con-
figuration data, and properly planned change
points is as great now as at any other time.
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Any change will impact the full range of oper-
ational tasks, from test and checkout proce-
dures to training. Careful screening of
changes and implementation planning will
keep the system operating successfully for
many years. Interaction with the ground and
flight teams will assure that valuable past les-
sons are not lost and that implementation pro-
ceeds smoothly. Not responding to valid needs
for evolutionary change will shorten useful
life and increase operating costs.
People: Building Commitment
and Attitudes
Project success will depend on the commit-
ment and attitudes of the people involved in
the project. The leadership of the project man-
ager and team is a dominant factor in estab-
lishing a motivational environment. Too often
we focus on organizational structure rather
than behavior. The organizational structure
of a project can vary from a direct-line project
team (everyone working for the project man-
ager) to a highly matrixed organization.
Which one is the best depends on many fac-
tors, such as the length of the project, the size,
the skill mix, and the history of the parent or-
ganization. All need to be considered, while
care is taken to balance project responsiveness
and organizational needs.
When we had to replace a multiplexer on the
Shuttle Columbia on the pad at KSC during
countdown, the only available spare was in
Palmdale, 3,000 miles away. Within 24 hours
the spare was delivered, installed, and
checked out in Columbia; the faulty unit was
returned to the manufacturer; and the fault
isolated to ensure we did not have a generic
problem. Without the commitment of every
person involved -- managers, technicians, lo-
gisticians, engineers, and pilots (at NASA,
Rockwell, and the subcontractor) -- two or
more days would have been lost, resulting in
increased costs as well as some very unfavor-
able criticism.
Crew technicians complete a timely repair of STS-2.
Similar events happen every day in the life of
a project. The approach the project manager
and the team take has a great deal to do with
instilling the commitment and attitudes nec-
essary for success. The following are tech-
niques I have seen others use and have used
myself.
Building Teamwork. It is important to treat
all people and organizational elements fairly.
There is no substitute for ethical behavior and
technical integrity. Open and honest commu-
nication among all team members is essential.
Praise goes much further than blame; and
criticism should be constructive, especially in
large meetings. The manager and the rest of
the team must work hard to establish a project
outlook, a customer outlook, an end-user out-
look, and a "can do" attitude. Getting these
views accepted will obviate many organiza-
tional squabbles. It is extremely important
also to build trust and teamwork among orga-
nizational entities: government, prime con-
tractor, subcontractors, suppliers, Headquar-
ters, and Centers.
Building Consensus. Since decisions are re-
quired at every level, effective interchange
must take place with all involved parties. The
manager listens carefully during the discus-
sions and then works hard to get everyone to
accept the decision as the agreed-upon course
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of action. Rarely are every person's desires
met. While differences of opinion are accept-
able, dissension is not. Furthermore, if new
information becomes available, the issue must
be revisited.
Quality is Mandatory. Since a quality prod-
uct is the project's objective and requirements
drive the entire system, all those involved
know that their commitment to meet require-
ments will foster product excellence. Estab-
lishing the means to re-examine require-
ments, processes, and procedures will also fos-
ter product excellence. This applies to every
aspect of the job: to letters and reports, as well
as the hardware products. Everyone must un-
derstand the job to be done. In working to
clean up processes and procedures, the project
manager will do well to involve the doers as
well as the writers. This will maintain an atti-
tude of excellence and result in a quality prod-
uct.
Time is of the Essence. Creating a sense of
urgency is essential for project success. Sched-
ules are established to ensure that all project
tasks are synchronized and resources are prop-
erly applied. Since the manager's actions and
team decisions are examples for everyone,
they should be timely. Adequate time must be
allocated and the schedule adhered to. The
project manager must clearly expect schedules
to be met or beaten and must follow up to
make sure the proper resources are being ap-
plied. If difficulties arise, then searching for a
workaround and eliminating the root cause is
much more productive than looking for some-
one to blame.
Cost is a Driver. Cost is an essential element
of the contract, and cost-effective performance
is everybody's job. All organizational ele-
ments need to recognize and commit to the cost
objectives. Getting quality and schedule per-
formance are major factors in cost perfor-
mance, and driving for simpler implementa-
tion improves both. The project manager has
to ensure that enough time is allowed to get
the simplifications at the design level and the
participation of needed disciplines. Life costs
must be a visible part of the decision-making
process.
Keeping in Touch. Too often the project
manager and team are consumed by meet-
ings, requests for status, and myriad other du-
ties which keep them in their own offices. This
is an easy trap to fall into. But the project
manager's presence is needed out on the floor,
within the organization, at peer organizations,
and at the contractors' sites. This presence
will motivate the workforce, demonstrate con-
cern, improve the information flow, and in-
cr._ase team responsiveness.
Selecting the Right Team. Since there is no
substitute for talent, the project manager
must select people who are technically strong
(i.e., in engineering, manufacturing, schedul-
ing, contracts, etc.) and who display the com-
mitment expected. Often, rotation of the peo-
ple into different assignments will help keep
the talented people involved and committed to
the project. Those who do not fit should be en-
couraged to find other tasks better suited to
their talents. A strong team will create the
peer pressure so vital to ensuring an effective
attitude.
Reward and Recognition. There are many
opportunities to reward performance. All too
often in relations between the government,
contractors, and subcontractors, profit is used
as a negative incentive. If contractors meet
their commitments, they have earned profit.
If they have stayed responsive to overall proj-
ect needs, they have earned a good share of the
profit. If possible, unawarded period profits
can be effectively rolled forward to provide ad-
ditional incentives. Similarly, budget under-
runs can be used to initiate needed work earli-
er if project resources allow. Incentive and
fixed-price contracts often allow sharing of
cost savings that result in additional profits
for the contractor while saving significant dol-
lars for the government. Gainsharing
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is becoming a popular way of passing perfor-
mance incentives to the individuals.
There are many ways to provide non-monetary
incentives to a project team. Commendation
letters, formal awards, public acknowledg-
ment, and a simple, spoken "well done" will go
a long way to building the commitment and at-
titude needed for project success.
Communicating Relevant Information
Recognize Differing Needs. Each level in
the customer, contractor, subcontractor, and
user organization has different needs for infor-
mation. Giving everybody everything is al-
most as bad as giving them nothing. Commu-
nications must, therefore, be planned in light
of established performance milestones that
measure progress meaningful to the level it is
reported to, in a form useful to the receiver,
and of value to those who provide it. Status
data can be verified by frequent site visits.
Some people believe that the answer to all our
information needs is an infinitely large, auto-
mated data base with embedded expert sys-
tems to help us extract the information we
need to make decisions. Others believe that
all the key data can be put on three-by-five
cards and carried by the project team through
the life ofthe program. I would like to share a
situation to help explain my view of what con-
stitutes relevant information.
During the approach and landing test on the
Shuttle program, the Rockwell team had re-
sponsibility for the vehicle prior to rollout
from the hangar. We completed the pre-
rollout tests, moved the vehicle out, and
passed control to mission control at JSC. On
one particular flight, we were having some dif-
ficulties with the inertial measurement unit's
alignment. A decision had to be made as to
whether the observed drift rates would be ac-
ceptable for flight. Although they were within
specification and met all the criteria, there
was obviously something going on that was
different from our expectations. We had only a
few minutes to decide whether we were "go" or
"no-go" for that day. I met with the two re-
sponsible engineering managers and their rec-
ommendation was "go." The information that
I needed was their technical rationale and how
they conveyed the data. It was more than the
numbers: it was also their confidence. Infor-
mation needs are dependent on the problem at
hand and the people involved. Information
consists of more than computer-storable or
written data.
In general, the two areas that are served the
worst are the top of the program, where infor-
mation is needed to plan future resource allo-
cations, and the detail working level (includ-
ing subcontractors), where daily work sched-
ules are made. The top area needs to under-
stand the future consequences of any major
event, and the detail level needs to understand
current detail status and decisions made that
affect in-process work. Some effective commu-
nication techniques are discussed in the next
sections.
Use Electronic Information. Modern
computer-based systems offer tremendous ca-
pability to provide detailed information to a
very large number of people. They can be used
for detailed technical data (drawings, parts
list, algorithms, system and software require-
ments, user notes, procedures, etc.). They can
be used also for scheduling and control infor-
mation (engineering orders, parts ordering,
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billing, inventory, configuration data, multi-
level schedules, etc.) and coordinating infor-
mation (electronic mail for bulletins, meet-
ings, decision status, etc.).
During Shuttle development, it would have
been impossible to complete the program with-
out computer-based information systems.
However, difficulty occurred with multi-
discipline information and multi-level (differ-
ent user level) data. The fundamental prob-
lem is that data were not structured into logi-
cally consistent databases. Inordinate effort
was required to translate, manipulate, and re-
format information. Therefore, care should be
taken on future projects to provide logical
structures, standards, and user-friendly inter-
faces to ensure that electronic techniques are
effectively used. (The NASA TMIS, Air Force
UNIS, and many corporate information sys-
tems are working on this issue.)
Use Meetings to Communicate. During the
Shuttle development program, many reviews,
panels, and boards were scheduled on a regu-
lar basis. Used properly, these were effective
means for communicating information, as well
as for making decisions. Daily morning meet-
ings between project functions at the contrac-
tor, between organizations at the launch site,
and between subsystem project managers at
the lead Center were used to measure the cur-
rent pulse of the project and resolve issues that
could impede work. Weekly meetings -- such
as the avionics review board (ARB), technical
status review (TSR), software control board
(SCB), change control board (CCB), program
review boards (PRBs), and vehicle status re-
views -- were ways to facilitate decisions that
had longer-term impact and to communicate
results to affected parties rapidly. Monthly or-
biter management reviews were an excellent
means for synchronizing all the functions, as
well as measuring cost and schedule perfor-
mance.
The problem, of course, becomes one of how to
do the work with all those meetings going on.
With proper attention to meeting duration,
participation, and completed staff work, these
meetings are very effective. Letting the per-
son who is closest to the issue present the in-
formation and the lowest-level person make
the decision will speed up the process and
spread the work. Written minutes, rapidly
prepared, distributed, and posted for all to see
will get the information to the "floor" where it
is often needed the most.
Consider Contract Data as Important. Too
often, the contract and its associated state-
ment of work and schedule of deliverables are
known only to a limited number of people in
the project chain -- at the customer and at the
contractor. Yet, the contract is the document
that communicates the official requirements
of the work to be done and the schedule for
when it is to be done. Since government agen-
cies rarely use the contract as a mechanism
within their own organizations and the con-
tractor operates similarly, there is a great mis-
conception about the contract's value: main-
taining its configuration, and using it as a
mechanism to communicate and control work.
Every project team leader should be familiar
with the contents of the contract, for it will en-
able them to maintain a fair and equitable po-
sition on many issues that will arise during
project performance. Insist on compliance
with the contract and initiate contract
changes when there is a legitimate addition,
subtraction, or change to be made.
Communicate with Your Customer. The
project team is both a supplier and a customer.
It is very important that the team recognize
this dual role' Too often I have seen the team
consider its customers (customers are both the
next level up in the project chain of command,
and those organizations that significantly
drive project requirements and funding) as en-
emies rather than friends. During the course
of a long-term project, the information flow is
virtually the only product that will assure
your customer that the project is on track.
Making this flow effective will also produce
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understanding of the external environment
and its dynamics, which, in turn, will generate
better decisions. An open, honest, and timely
information flow among the project team, cus-
tomers, and suppliers is a key ingredient of
project success.
Conclusion
Project management, especially as it has de-
veloped through NASA's large-scale successes,
is an extremely rewarding field. It enables
each of us to take part and direct a portion of
this nation's progress. In the project manager
role, we take on considerable responsibility,
for we are accountable for the use of very valu-
able assets. It is our job to ensure delivery of a
system with the required performance, at or
before the planned time, and within cost lim-
its. Many skills are required and tools needed
to be an effective project manager. Today, the
task is being made both a little easier with im-
provements in communication media and si-
multaneously harder within our "fishbowl"
environment. Building on past success and
learning from mistakes are important.
I have discussed what I believe are some es-
sential principles in effective project manage-
ment. There is no compromise to quality;
proper requirements are a solid foundation;
things will change; committed people make
the difference; and communication of relevant
information will keep a team on course.
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Basically, project and systems management is
nothing new. It is axiomatic that since the
dawn of history there have been groups of hu-
man beings trying to achieve a common goal
within a certain time span and with available
resources. These project-oriented groups were
immediately confronted with the problems of
organizing and managing such efforts and re-
sources in order to reach their goal on time
and with minimum expenditure. In modern
times we call the educational approach to such
an undertaking "Project and Systems Manage-
ment." Large projects of a scientific and tech-
nical nature generally involve:
achieve other goals. It soon became evident
that such projects, of great magnitude and
complexity, had to be considered under the
overall "systems" point of view continuously
during execution. The alternative to such a
concept leads inevitably to non-optimal tech-
nical solutions, cost overruns, and schedule
slippages which would occur to the embarrass-
ment of the responsible country, agency or
firm. Therefore, terms like "Systems Manage-
ment," "Systems Engineering," "Systems
Planning," etc., were introduced to describe
the systems aspects that had been emphasized
as an inescapable necessity.
Q A multitude of government agencies, in-
dustrial firms and other organizations,
sometimes on an international basis;
• Funds in the multimillion to billion dollar
category;
• Complex technology sometimes reaching
beyond the state of the art;
• Large forces of scientists, engineers, tech-
nicians and administrative personnel; and
• Construction of extensive and highly spe-
cialized facilities.
This type of project became more and more
common in this century and especially in re-
cent decades to solve problems of national and
worldwide importance, to pursue large-scale
scientific endeavors, to meet the needs created
by a rapidly expanding world population, or to
The management scheme that was developed
and applied to the Apollo Program, a complex
and technologically difficult program, is par-
ticularly interesting. It is now well-known
that the technical complexities and the pio-
neering nature of this unprecedented under-
taking were finally very successful, but the
program was also accompanied by shortcom-
ings, setbacks, and deficiencies during its ex-
ecution -- all of which challenged the manage-
ment system. It soon became clear that the
project management had to be extremely flexi-
ble and capable of meeting unforeseen de-
mands. It was also apparent that determina-
tion, resoluteness and faith would be vital if
the goal were to be achieved.
To assure success of the Apollo Program, the
first order of business was to minimize techni-
cal risks or actually mission risks as much as
possible and, at the same time, to keep closely
to the time schedule. Because of the rigid de-
!
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mands of this time schedule, it was necessary
wherever possible to engage in parallel rather
than consecutive developments. In order to re-
duce technical risks, backup solutions in cer-
tain unprecedented areas, sometimes down to
the component level, had to be concurrently
pursued. For example, all possible abort
schemes one could think of were considered
and designed for, to provide the maximum pos-
sible safety. This concept is expensive, but it
was accepted as an alternative to increased
possibility of failure of the whole program.
Tight budget control and highest economy in
expenditure were, of course, strong require-
ments but were subordinate to technical needs
and the demands of the time schedule. Natu-
rally, there is a trade-off between acceptable
technical risks or product quality, time sched-
ule and project cost. For instance, to eliminate
the technical risk problem, frequently undue
quality control or overtesting of hardware is
applied which delays schedules and makes
costs skyrocket. If the program management
permits faulty components to enter the system
-- due to lack of quality control and testing --
the components would only be detected in
overall checkouts. And finally, unrealistically
short time schedules endanger the quality of
the product and cost control, whereas long,
drawn-out time plans increase total project
cost.
In summary, there has to be an optimum bal-
ance among technical performance, time
schedule and cost. In the Apollo Program, this
balance was deliberately shifted toward tech-
nical performance and time schedule. Depend-
ing on the nature of a project, such a balance
could as well shift in the direction of economy
and trade-in on technical performance.
Short Summary of the Apollo Program
For a better understanding of the manage-
ment concept and of the problems confronting
management, a brief history of the Apollo Pro-
gram might be helpful. The mission as stated
by the President of the United States and ap-
proved by the Congress was to land a man on
the Moon in the decade of the 1960s and return
him safely to Earth. During the excursion, sci-
entific experiments were to be conducted for
exploration of the Moon and its origin in order
to provide a better understanding of the possi-
ble age and creation of the solar system. Also,
other corollary research was to be undertaken.
It has been common practice in government
circles to use the term "program" to describe a
large, multimillion dollar undertaking. With-
in such a program, major elements have com-
monly been referred to as "projects." Thus, the
lunar program in its entirety is referred to as
"Apollo." The Saturn launch vehicle, an ele-
ment of the total program, would properly be
called a project. It is my understanding that in
commercial or industrial practice, the term
"project" is generally used rather than "pro-
gram." For consistency, I shall use the term
"program" for Apollo.
The program was started in 1961. Early snap-
shot estimates of cost were between $20 billion
and $40 billion. After the program was laid
out and firmly established, detailed calcula-
tions brought the estimates closer to $20 bil-
lion. Of this money, approximately 90 percent
was spent in industry and 10 percent in gov-
ernment operations. During the peak of the
effort, approximately 12,000 government em-
ployees and approximately 300,000 people in
industry were employed. An investment of ap-
proximately $2.5 billion in new construction of
facilities was made all over the United States
at industry and government installations.
These included the build-up of new govern-
ment Centers; namely, the Manned Spacecraft
Center at Houston, Texas, and the Kennedy
Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida. It
also comprised an expansion of the Marshall
Space Flight Center at Huntsville, Alabama,
including subsidiaries for production and test-
ing at other locations.
25
Project and Systems Management in the Apollo Program
The total program consisted of the develop-
ment and production of three types of launch
vehicles; namely, Saturn, Saturn IB and Sat-
urn V, and two types of spacecraft: a Com-
mand Service Module and a Lunar Landing
Module. As a precursor, the Gemini Program
was introduced. The special objectives were to
improve life support systems and to develop
docking processes, extravehicular activities
and other techniques for Apollo.
Basic Principles Established in the
Apollo Program Management System
After agreement had been reached on the
method for traveling to the Moon and landing,
and departure from the lunar surface for re-
turn to Earth, attention was turned toward es-
tablishing certain management basics to as-
sure effective program execution. The size and
complexity of the effort added an increased im-
portance to such considerations.
First of all, there had to be "a superior plan-
ning effort." I venture to state that, without
diligent planning -- especially systems plan-
ning -- right from the start, any project is
doomed sooner or later to run into most serious
difficulties. To recover from such planning
failure costs large sums of money and time de-
lays. It also brings a program into technical
trouble which, as history has shown, could re-
sult even in cancellation.
Solid planning starts with master plans on
hardware, software, and overall systems as to
technical approaches; resources such as facili-
ties, manpower and funds; and, finally, sched-
ules. Important are detailed breakdowns of
the overall job and the system into subsystems
and what is called in Apollo "work packages."
Then come the significant areas of planning of
contracts and the contractor structure. This
results in the determination of which pack-
ages to assign to prime contractors and, in spe-
cial cases, to major subcontractors who are to
be selected by Source Evaluation Boards. This
selection is based on work statements, Re-
quests for Proposals, and their submissions.
The selected prime contractors have to be in-
corporated immediately into the planning ac-
tivity.
It is strange that so few otherwise gifted man-
agers and engineers do not see the significance
and the great importance of proper planning.
Such seems to be the case, however. It ex-
plains at least partially why we had great dif-
ficulties in finding technical experts who un-
derstood the value of planning. For the mili-
tary, strategic planning is a matter of course.
The same is true for any commercial under-
taking where to neglect planning is to court
bankruptcy. Why it is so hard to introduce
proper planning into project and system man-
agement of projects of a more scientific nature
is perplexing to me.
For success in any program or project, large or
small, I consider it a dominant principle that
management must have what we in the Apollo
Program called "visibility." This means that
the management at all levels should know al-
most in "real time" what is going on in the pro-
gram: technical occurrences, schedule
progress or delays, and financial status. From
the outset of the program, proper and effective
channels and ways of communication have to
be established on the government side be-
tween upper and lower echelons of manage-
ment. Similarly, the prime contractors must
provide equally effective channels down to
their respective subcontractors. Such an infor-
mation system should not only depict the past
and present status, but, more importantly,
should also enable management -- again on all
levels -- to predict trends in the progression of
the program. The prediction of trends for some
months ahead, or even longer, is vital for tak-
ing corrective steps before the program runs
into impediments. The capability of manage-
ment to foretell trouble and thus avoid it by
appropriate actions was one of the major cor-
nerstones of the Apollo success.
Z
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Next of importance was the establishment of
certain "review milestones," that is, scheduled
dates of management review between govern-
ment and prime contractors. Such reviews
are, for instance, in a chronological sequence:
Program Requirements Review PRR
Preliminary Design Review PDR
Critical Design Review CDR
Design Certification Review DCR
Pre-Delivery Turn-Over Review PDTR
Flight Readiness Review FRR
Countdown Demonstration
Test and its review CDDT
Figure 1 shows these reviews over the life of a
program and the process applied to lead to a
particular launching. Some indication of tim-
ing of the review span may be gained by not-
ing that the Countdown Demonstration Test
and review preceded an Apollo launching by
five weeks.
In the Apollo Program there were many more
reviews beyond those shown. They all served
to critically examine and assess the project
status, to affirm the quality of the product and
its reliability, and to assure systems safety.
Every review resulted in protocolled action
items. As the resolution of problems raised at
each of the reviews was completed, the con-
tractor was authorized to go ahead with the
next increment of the overall plan.
Also employed as an important management
tool was the PERT, or Program Evaluation
and Review Technique. This well-known ap-
proach needs no further elaboration.
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Configuration control was another necessary
management tool in the Apollo Program. This
control scheme assured that:
The contractor followed acceptable draw-
ing room practice as to procedure and disci-
pline;
• Design intentions were carried through
manufacturing;
• Only mandatory changes were approved;
The exact configuration, known down to
the most minute detail, was delivered to
the launching site; and
Failures or unsuitable hardware or materi-
al could be traced down to the point o£ ori-
gin. Apollo management called this "trace-
ability."
Configuration control carried out in a strict
sense is very expensive. It is, therefore, vital
that these controls not be overdone and that
they are wisely introduced to prime contrac-
tors and subcontractors.
Application of the penetration principle did
not stop at the government-contractor bound-
ary. Instead, it permeated through the con-
tractor organization to the subcontractor
structure. Spawned by this approach, im-
proved failure analysis appeared throughout
the system; in-process inspection was main-
tained at a high level; and receiving inspection
techniques and effectiveness were improved,
among other benefits.
The application of the penetration approach
resulted in a a vastly improved and effective
communication channel with a host of side
benefits. So while it might on the surface ap-
pear as an invasion of prerogative by the gov-
ernment, actually penetration should be look-
ed upon as the close interaction of highly dedi-
cated, competent technical and scientific per-
sonnel, all motivated by the impressive chal-
lenge of a huge complex program, no matter
whether they are government or contractor
employees. Most instrumental in this
government-contractor relationship was the
establishment of resident personnel in the
prime contractor plants.
Another point basic to the management of the
programs involves "contracting principles."
Early in the Apollo Program, cost-plus-fixed-
fee contracts were employed. The reason for
using this contracting approach is rooted in
the uncertainties of effective, close pricing in
such a program with its many unknowns.
Subsequently, the incentive fee contract was
introduced. Essentially the fee applied con-
sisted of two parts, one a base fee of modest
proportions and the second a scaled or incen-
tire segment. As the name implies, the
amount of incentive fee awarded to a contrac-
tor in addition to the base fee was a direct re-
sult of success in meeting program product re-
quirements for performance, cost, and time
schedule. The incentive fee contract lends it-
self well to hardware contracts with reason-
able, well-determined milestones, cost levels
and schedule. (I should point out here that in
several cases where contractors were exper-
iencing troubles, effective management prac-
tice was considered in adjudging fee.)
In contract arrangements where the param-
eters are not easily distinguished in advance,
a variation known as award fee contracting is
used. The contractor is adjudged on a more
general basis; support service or engineering
service contracts fall into this category. It
may be seen rather clearly that this method of
contracting is motivational in nature, thus ful-
filling an important management require-
ment cited earlier.
Beyond the contracting device, additional and
continuing motivational or inspirational tech-
niques were used. While the award and incen-
rive fee channel reached the interior of an or-
ganization through conventional management
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rectly to the workforce of contractor and sub-
contractor. Located in the program and major
project offices was a Manned Flight Aware-
ness Office. The function of this office was to
keep all program workers aware of the need
for success by each individual. This was an ef-
fective technique that became tangible when
merit awards and recognition were issued.
There are a number of other pertinent princi-
ples upon which the effectiveness of program
management depends. Although they apply in
other management schemes and in programs
where the government is not involved, in a
program-oriented structure, they are critical:
• Organize and motivate to achieve effective
high morale in the workforce;
• Delegate authority clearly, concisely and
positively to achieve timely decisions;
• Apply innovative concepts and techniques
courageously;
• Keep objectives pointed toward the goal;
• Require continuing study and application
of the systems engineering approach; and
• Relate actions to schedule and to budget
continuously.
The Apollo Management System
In the actual managerial arrangement that
used the principles I have mentioned to man-
age the program throughout its life, we did
not enjoy any measure of managerial "genius"
in running our changing, dynamic organiza-
tion. On the contrary, our management sys-
tem evolved after some painful experiences in
the early days of Apollo. In fact, at the begin-
ning of the program in 1961, there was no com-
mon system in existence within the rather
young National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration. Then as the program gathered
headway and matured, the management sys-
tem became better defined, changing as neces-
sary to keep pace with unfolding events. Early
it was learned that in the environment of a big
development project, there can be no static
system. Change and evolution are inevitable.
Figure 2 is what we called the "Apollo Pro-
gram Trend Chart." Management used this
chart to follow the progress of every major
component such as rocket stages, engines,
spacecraft, etc. In this case it was employed as
a master chart for predicting the landing date
on the Moon. On the ordinate you see the
planned launch date and on the abscissa the
reporting date or the status. This visibility
scheme was introduced in 1965 after the first
lunar landing date, originally planned for the
first half of 1967, slipped several times.
By 1962, after the decision on how to go to the
Moon and after the introduction of the Gemini
Project, the Apollo Program began to take
shape rapidly. Budgets had increased deci-
sively. American aerospace industries and
universities were significantly expanding
their involvement. Also, of course, by this
time three sizable Centers were involved to ca-
pacity in the technical and managerial de-
mands of their respective Apollo assignments.
This involved multimillion dollar projects at
each -- the command module, service module
and lunar module at Houston; three stages
and an instrument unit at the Marshall Space
Flight Center in Huntsville; and assembly and
launch operations at Cape Kennedy. Coupled
with the national involvement of the industri-
al complex, the need for innovative overall
management was clear. For this and other
reasons, the Apollo Program management of-
fice in Washington, and the project manage-
ment offices at the three field Centers, were
thus restructured and strengthened to fulfill
the vital role of the overall integration and
management of all contractor, field Center
and university efforts.
Figure 3 shows how the Apollo Program Office
was placed in the complex of the Manned
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Figure 2. The Apollo Program Trend Chart.
Space Flight organization of NASA Headquar-
ters. Note that the Apollo Program box ap-
pears in the NASA command structure just as
any functional or institutional segment would
appear, reporting to the Associate Administra-
tor, who, in turn, reports directly to the NASA
Administrator.
Figure 4 depicts the Apollo Program manage-
ment structure. Some of its features require
special attention in order to thoroughly under-
stand the actual arrangement.
The Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight at the same time chaired the
Management Council. Its membership con-
sisted of the Associate Administrator's depu-
ties and the field Center directors with their
deputies. Acting in a directive role, the Asso-
ciate Administrator passed instructions to the
field Center or to the Apollo Program Office.
In turn, the Center director, through member-
ship on the Management Council, had a direct
voice in shaping the program direction which
comes to the Center for execution. The Coun-
cil met once a month or at the direction of the
Associate Administrator, its Chairman. At
these meetings, the Apollo Program Director
in Washington and the project managers of the
field Centers reported to the Council. The pro-
ject managers included the Saturn V Manager
from the Marshall Space Flight Center, the
Apollo Spacecraft Manager from the Manned
Spacecraft Center, and the Manager for Apollo
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Figure 3. Manned Space Flight Organization, 1968.
The topic of these presentations covered,
among others, the following principal areas:
• Where did the money go and can we man-
age with the allotted funds remaining?
What planned tasks have been accom-
plished and can we meet the projected
schedule?
What are our major technical and program-
matic problems and what previously un-
foreseen actions must be taken to overcome
them?
• What are our motivational problems?
The Design Certification Review (DCR) was
part of the Management Council meetings and
the certification was signed by the Chairman
and the three Center directors.
Five organizational segments reported direct-
ly to the Apollo Program Office. They were
the major units through which the program di-
rector managed the program. Corresponding
to this organization was the field Center's or-
ganization with exactly the same segments.
The names of the boxes are self-explanatory.
A similar organizational structure was set up
at the prime contractors, to the extent that
such was necessary.
Figure 5 indicates the manner in which the
contractors, prime and sub, may relate to a
project. The diagram in this case pertains to
the Saturn Project at the Marshall Space
Flight Center and the corresponding contrac-
tor structure. Of particular interest here is
the relationship between the institutional
technical capability and the project manager
on the one hand, and this capability and the
contractor on the other.
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Figure 4. Apollo Saturn Program Management.
The ready access that the project director had
to the engineering expertise of the Center was
of particular importance in maintaining real-
time project visibility and control. For maxi-
mum effectiveness, the institutional capabil-
ity must respond to specific requests and
maintain continuing surveillance, thus expos-
ing unsatisfactory technical trends early
enough to allow preventive measures. As an
additional contribution, the in-house technical
capability may and frequently did respond to
requests from the prime contractor.
Other areas of the Apollo Program that were
of great significance to the program manage-
ment are:
The system logistics: that is, transporta-
tion of hardware from manufacturer to
launching site, supply of propellants, pres-
surants, spare parts, etc.;
• The safety and security system;
• Astronaut training with all the training
hardware and simulators;
• The medical aspects of the expedition;
• The organization and management of the
scientific endeavor;
• The determination of the landing sites on
the Moon;
• The ground organization and the world-
wide network for tracking and data acqui-
sition during a mission. Sixteen stations
distributed around the Earth had to be op-
erated, many in foreign countries; and
• Finally, the planning of the mission opera-
tion and the mission operation itself.
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All these subjects comprise major activities
which had to be integrated into an overall
management system. In order to provide
maximum control and visibility of the system
and of all occurrences in the program, a sys-
tem of control rooms was established. These
rooms contained up-to-date information and
displays and were located at the Apollo Pro-
gram Director's Office in Washington and at
the three Manned Space Flight Centers and at
each prime contractor. Each control room was
equipped to permit conference calls between
Headquarters and the Centers. This commu-
nication system furnished a means for greatly
accelerating the decision-making process.
I should now like to explain the matter of inte-
grating the project office, the functional ele-
ments of the institutional organization, and
the contractor. Three categories of concern
emerge. First, there are the hardware, sys-
tems and subsystems specialists who devote
attention to the delivery of items that are tech-
nically adequate and qualified for mission per-
formance. Second, there are the specialists
who approach the project from the point of
view of controlling costs and schedules. As the
third organizational element in the grouping,
there is the on-site resident management of-
rice. Staffing this latter element were special-
ists located at the contractor's facility to as-
sure that project management interests were
advanced and that decisions were made and
implemented within the designated scope of
authority of the resident group.
This resident element proved to be a most im-
portant link between government and contrac-
tor activities. To expedite decisions, the resi-
dent manager required functional support,
which was provided by specialized, on-site con-
tract administration and technical engineer-
ing staff. These support personnel were as-
signed from parent functional organizations of
the responsible Center. Within well-
established limits, these people could make de-
cisions "on the spot" or commit the parent of-
rice or function at the Center. The result was
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to speed the project management process and
to provide a dynamic interface with the con-
tractor on a continuing day-to-day basis. It
was in this relatively small unit that the rela-
tionship of project management and functional
discipline was most clearly mirrored; where
the integration of technical and managerial
personnel became most apparent. This unit
also provided a mechanism for tempering the
varying emphasis on government project and
functional groups in the contractor organiza-
tion. For example, the technical functions
tend to strive primarily toward perfection to a
degree that possibly inhibits adequate atten-
tion to manufacturing and launch schedules or
cost. The contractor could well be oriented to-
ward schedule, costs and profits, whereas the
project manager might weigh concern more
heavily on schedule and costs. Through the of-
rice of the resident manager, an automatic sys-
tem of checks and balances developed to the
end that each consideration received its appro-
priate share of attention.
Conclusion
A number of the points I have raised offer a
high potential for solving difficult problems.
One of these is the technique of contractor pen-
etration to obtain visibility. There is an un-
derstandably strong desire on the part of in-
dustry to take the control and the funding and
to do the job with but minor government inter-
vention. However, there have been too many
cases of severe program impacts when this al-
ternative to close contractor surveillance has
been permitted. The restiveness that
stemmed from such close control gradually
dissipated early in the Apollo Program as the
benefits accruing from the industry-
government teams approach were revealed.
In forming the project or program offices, it is
clear that the manager must have control of
competent technical and administrative staff
in order to conduct activities efficiently. In the
event that such competence is not available, a
vital principle would be jeopardized -- that of
responsibility requiring adequate authority.
Competent staff members must be drawn from
the functionally oriented disciplines.
Yet another aspect of personnel concerns the
disposition of people upon termination or com-
pletion of a program. It is not sufficient to rel-
egate them to positions formerly held, particu-
larly in the case of technical persons. If a new
program is forthcoming, the problem is eased
somewhat, although it is highly likely that re-
training or refresher education will be re-
quired. In any event, the transition from pro-
gram management status back to a technical
activity in a laboratory can indeed be traumat-
ic. It is here that the institutional leadership
must be asserted on the highest plane.
While centralized program management has
many values, of prime importance is the as-
signment of all responsibility to single organi-
zational management structures, pyramiding
into a single strong personality. This prevents
fragmenting vital responsibility among nu-
merous individuals with subsequent loss in
time, money, manpower and technical
progress. Of course with the responsibility,
the manager must have commensurate au-
thority to resolve technical, financial, produc-
tion and other problems that otherwise re-
quire coordination and approval in separate
channels at different echelons. And the man-
ager must have clear, concise communications
flowing in all directions.
With these tools, program management can
apply all the capabilities -- technological, so-
ciological, economic, or whatever -- to any pro-
ject and systems problem, however large or
complex it might be.
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from 1961 to 1965: The Vision and the Reality
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NASA Administrator James E. Webb had
been in office only three months before Presi-
dent Kennedy announced his decision for a
manned lunar landing. Webb was in charge of
a rapid acceleration in the NASA budget and
staff. While the program build-up was under
way, Webb instigated a series of internal man-
agement analyses and reviews, some of which
were extensions of initiatives taken by his pre-
decessor. One of the major problem areas first
explored was the Headquarters-Field Center
relationship, one which has been studied and
reorganized almost continuously ever since.
During NASA's first three years, the field
Centers reported to Headquarters program di-
rectors rather than to general management.
There were two major weaknesses in this sys-
tem. The subordination of Center directors to
Headquarters program directors tended to cre-
ate a gulf between the field and Headquarters.
Secondly, the Headquarters program offices
tended to be more narrowly focused than the
more multi-purpose field Centers, and there
was a mismatch in the missions and institu-
tional interests of the various field Centers
and their respective program offices in Wash-
ington.
In November 1961, the first of many subse-
quent reorganizations was authorized, putting
the field Centers directly under the Associate
Administrator, Robert C. Seamans, Jr., who
was later to become Air Force Secretary. The
field Centers continued to receive specific pro-
gram direction from the program offices, but
were no longer subordinate to the program As-
sociate Administrators. Earlier in his first
year, Webb had authorized another major re-
organization, establishing a new Office of Pro-
grams and an Office of Administration based
on a unit previously called the Office of Busi-
ness Administration. The Office of Programs
was responsible for integrating NASA's pro-
gram planning, facilities coordination, man-
agement planning, resources programming
and project reviews. As a means of exercising
this function, the office established the Pro-
gram Approval Document (PAD) system to
govern the process of Headquarters review of
specific programs. This new office and the Of-
rice of Administration both reported to Robert
Seamans.
The 1961 reorganization fell short of expecta-
tions. Three reasons attributed to the failure
were: 1) the tendency of the new structure to
create a "free-for-all" between the field Cen-
ters and Headquarters, 2) the undermining of
the authority of Headquarters program direc-
tors to give direction over anything but specif-
ic, discrete projects, and 3) the imposition of a
crushing overload of responsibilities on a sin-
gle Associate Administrator, Robert Seamans.
Although the 1961 reorganization had served
to remind Centers that NASA had a central
purpose to which all local interests were secon-
dary, it could not be maintained as a perma-
nent arrangement.
In November 1963, the structure reverted
back to one in which field Centers reported to
the Headquarters program office responsible
for their primary program activities. As Webb
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observed several years later, the purpose of
the 1963 reorganization was to emphasize that
a Headquarters program director, newly des-
ignated as an "Associate Administrator," was
"a guy running his show.., and that he ought
to think of himself as nearly as possible doing
the total job. He had to present his program to
Congress he wasn't just an internal manager.
For his area he had almost as broad responsi-
bility as the Administrator."1
Nevertheless, important aspects of Seamans'
role as "general manager" remained un-
changed. The program Associate Administra-
tors continued to meet regularly with him, and
he continued to oversee the various internal
management systems such as the PAD pro-
cess. The decision to switch the Field Center-
Headquarters relationship back to what had
existed only two years before illustrates
Webb's belief in the importance of flexibility
and adaptability. In Space Age Management:
The Large-scale Approach, a volume based on
his Columbia-McKinsey lectures delivered in
1968, Webb wrote as follows: "Our constant
effort has been to obtain a sufficient real-time
feedback from the fastest-moving parts of our
substantive and administrative activities to
enable us to alter our course as needed. We
have sought patterns of organization and ad-
ministration that facilitated fast reaction
times to signals of incipient failure or emerg-
ing opportunity."2
What Webb recognized as an essential part of
the ethos of NASA was the need for a continu-
ing process of adjustment and adaptation to
dynamics of change both within and outside
the agency. He saw that NASA could not be
governed by the old-style principles of public
administration which sought to assure stabil-
ity and order within a rigid hierarchical
framework. To accommodate the fast-moving
scientific and technological projects for which
NASA provided a home, NASA would have to
stay loose. The components of the organiza-
tion: the field Centers and Headquarters; the
program and project offices imposed on a ma-
trix organizational structure; the complex of
in-house management; and the much greater
corpus of outside contractors -- this vast array
of disparate parts could never be expected to
become a stable and harmonious entity. In an
unpredictable and sometimes turbulent envi-
ronment, Webb recognized a need to maintain
a desired level of disequilibrium.
This philosophical approach has been accepted
within NASA throughout the post-Webb era,
but with varying degrees of commitment.
Much of NASA's subsequent organizational
history has evolved around the weighing of
tradeoffs between the risk-taking, free-
wheeling management style, and the search
for more traditional values of order, continuity
and stability.
Centralization versus Decentralization
The search for the best organizational pattern
has also entailed a continuing quest for the
best blend of centralization and decentraliza-
tion. Several issues have been critical to the
structure of the reporting relationships be-
tween the field and Headquarters.
. How to maintain the desired degree of
autonomy and independent initiative at
the field Center level.
t How to assure that the Headquarters pro-
gram Associate Administrators exercise
adequate control over their respective pro-
grams without engaging in "micro-
management."
. How to provide for adequate communica-
tions between the Administrator and field
Center directors without overwhelming the
Administrator or undercutting the pro-
gram Associate Administrator.
. How to find an individual with the right
personality to serve in the Headquarters
office to which the field Centers report.
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Experience with the several types of reporting
relationships suggests that there is no single
"right" way to set them up. What works at one
time may not necessarily work at another.
The arrangement should be responsive to the
management imperatives of the contemporary
environment. In any case, the success of the
total complex of reporting relationships de-
pends on the crossfeed of significant and
meaningful information among those having a
"need to know" and the timely upward flow of
the important information to whomever is re-
sponsible for the agency's general manage-
ment.
In the early days of NASA, the field Centers
tended to have more discrete roles and thus to
work only or mostly on programs falling under
a single Headquarters program office. There
was an obvious logic in clustering groups of
Centers under the several program offices at
Headquarters. Over the years the field Cen-
ters, each seeking to build capability to com-
pete for future projects, expanded their respec-
tive areas of competence. At the same time, as
the dimensions of the larger manned flight
programs such as the Shuttle grew, the num-
ber of Centers working on a single program in-
creased correspondingly. Thus a new configu-
ration evolved in which most of the Centers
were working on programs falling under more
than one Headquarters program office.
Personalities and Personal Relations
The question of personality cited above is a
crucially important -- some would say the
most important -- factor in determining how
well the Headquarters-Field Center reporting
relationship works. Obviously it is essential
that the individual to whom the Center direc-
tors report in Headquarters be someone in
whom they can place their confidence. The job
calls for a rare combination of experience and
talent-- including an ability to understand the
Center directors and to represent them in an
even-handed way -- and a toughness in imple-
menting sometimes unwelcome decisions.
The relationships between Headquarters and
the field reflect in large measure the chemis-
try existing among the personalities of the Ad-
ministrator, the Deputy, the Associate Admin-
istrators for programs, and Center directors.
Ideally, all these players should fit together as
a closely knit and mutually supportive team.
They should be able to understand each others'
needs and subordinate the goals of their re-
spective positions and organizations to the
broader goals of the agency.
Strength Through Diversity
Since the real world is, in fact, far from the
ideal, a state of such harmony is always elu-
sive. People in Washington and people in the
field can never have the same perspectives and
values. The Washington outlook is dominated
by the power politics of the nation's capital
and the struggle to maintain NASA's place in
the federal establishment. Center outlooks
are more oriented to specific research and de-
velopment tasks to be accomplished. More-
over, from Center to Center there is a built-in
rivalry. Each Center nourishes an absolute
conviction that it is the best of the lot. Each
Center is hard at work to make its own place
strong and secure in whatever lies ahead for
NASA. No Center is willing to reveal its en-
tire hand to other Centers or, for that matter,
to Headquarters. Nevertheless, Centers can
and do cooperate effectively on agency pro-
grams and projects. In the process, they share
facilities, people, and ideas. Institutional loy-
alties, however, tend for the most part to stay
fixed.
Thus NASA is significantly different from
many large decentralized organizations in ei-
ther the public or private sector. Compared
with the military establishment, for example,
NASA often appears to resemble the collection
of military services operating with consider-
able rivalry under the Department of Defense
rather than a single military service. Indeed,
the competition among the Centers is mostly a
positive force spurring each Center to excel in
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comparison with its peers. In the private sec-
tor the closest analogy would be a loosely-knit
conglomerate with autonomous profit centers
rather than a fully integrated single-line com-
pany.
In the case of either the public or the private
analogy, all the elements of the organization
share common goals but may differ sharply on
the means for reaching those ends. The job of
top management is to see that the best means
are selected out of the competing ideas ad-
vanced by the various contenders in the orga-
nization. The NASA Administrator must at-
tend to a great deal of advice, often conflicting,
from contractors, the scientific community,
and the numerous NASA advisory bodies. The
Administrator's task is to maintain the U.S.
position of strength in our aeronautics and
space programs, building on the diversity of
policies, programs and resources over which
varying degrees of control are exercised.
Once an idea has prevailed in the internal
competition among all the technical and pro-
fessional experts, the Administrator must sell
the idea to those who hold the purse strings.
Thus a NASA Administrator will be judged in
large measure by success or failure in persuad-
ing the President, the Office of Management
and Budget, and the Congress which programs
will best support the aeronautical research
and space interests of the nation.
The Triumvirate
Another hallmark of Webb's administration
was his acceptance of the concept of shared
decision-making at the top. We have noted the
important role played by Seamans as an inter-
nal manager. Hugh L. Dryden, who had for-
merly headed the National Advisory Commit-
tee for Aeronautics and served as NASA Depu-
ty Administrator under Glennan, had re-
mained in the deputy position under Webb.
Dryden was a highly respected aerospace sci-
entist with a vast network of connections
throughout the scientific community.
During the years until Dryden's death in 1965,
the three top leaders of NASA -- Webb, Dry-
den, and Seamans -- formed a triumvirate in
which all three worked as a team in every
sense of the word. Webb insisted that each
was to be a full-scale participant in adminis-
trative as well as substantive decisions. As
James Beggs noted in the inaugural lecture of
the National Academy of Public Administra-
tion's James E. Webb Fund for Excellence in
Public Administration:
"It was agreed that in policy and prac-
tice no one of the three would act to do
violence to the strongly-held views of
the other two. The three were commit-
ted to ensure that all of NASA's lead-
ership needs were considered and met
at all levels.'"
Webb himself described the three-man rela-
tionship as one which intentionally bound the
three men in "hoops of iron." A major applica-
tion of this policy was a process requiring that
all procurement decisions over $5 million be
made by all three men. They reviewed the rec-
ommendations of a technical/managerial team
representing the most informed thinking on
any individual procurement up to their level.
Each final selection was made by the top three
executives.3
Seeking Outside Advice
One of Webb's guiding principles was to
spread the toughest problems over the largest
possible number of capable minds. As the
member of the triumverate who served as "Mr.
Outside," Webb was especially interested in
seeking outside advice. Nearly ninety cents
out of every NASA budget dollar was spent
outside the agency, mainly in contracts with
the aerospace industry, which provided a ma-
jor source of advise on engineering and techni-
cal questions. Webb also fostered an imposing
network of university and academic relation-
ships. Through the Sustaining University
Program initiated by Webb in 1961, NASA
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over the next decade channeled more than
$100 million to academic institutions in sup-
port of research and the doctoral programs of
more than 5,000 scientists and engineers. An
additional $42 million was channeled to uni-
versities for construction of research facilities
on 31 campuses. Webb was thus able to tap
into the best thinking of industry, the aca-
demic community, and the able people whom
he gathered together within the agency. He
extensively used management consultant
teams and individuals, and the many special
advisory committees and panels set up by the
National Academy of Sciences.
Because of his special interest in administra-
tion and management, Webb was elected
President of the American Society for Public
Administration (ASPA) in 1966. He soon
came to see the need for an organization which
could perform an equivalent role in public ad-
ministration to that of the National Academy
of Sciences in its field. He felt that NASA and
other government agencies should have access
to a source of trusted counsel that could give
advice on questions pertaining to manage-
ment and administration. Accordingly, Webb
organized those who had preceded him as
ASPA presidents to become the founders of the
National Academy of Public Administration.
NASA provided the initial funds that permit-
ted the academy to open its doors while con-
ducting some initial studies of NASA manage-
ment. The granting of a federal charter to the
Academy in 1984 represented a major mile-
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Reorganization: A NASA Management
Refrain
As noted in the earlier discussion of the
reorganization during the Webb admini-
stration, the Field Center-Headquarters
reporting relationship has undergone many
permutations throughout the agency's history.
In the spring of 1974, Dr. Fletcher and his col-
leagues began to believe that in a period of
budget reduction such as NASA was exper-
iencing, the Headquarters-Field Center re-
porting alignment was no longer responsive to
overall agency needs. Accordingly, another
major reorganization was implemented, estab-
lishing for the first time an Office of Associate
Administrator for Center Operations. Two
subsidiary offices, one for Institutional Man-
agement and a second for Headquarters Ad-
ministration, were set up under this new Asso-
ciate Administrator.4 Again, as in the period
from 1961 to 1963, the field Centers reported
to a single Headquarters office. The new Of-
fice of Institutional Management, responsible
for agency-wide institutional management,
was a response to concern in the field about in-
adequate attention in Headquarters program
offices to institutional resources, namely the
equipment, facilities, and personnel required
to sustain the technical and scientific capabil-
ity of the Centers.5
In his second year in office, Fletcher's succes-
sor, Dr. Robert A. Frosch, found that the Field
Center-Headquarters reporting relationship
put into effect four years earlier by Dr. Fletch-
er was not working to the satisfaction of most
of the key people involved. Frosch instituted a
first-ever system in which all the Centers and
all the program Associate Administrators re-
ported directly to him. The new system gave
the Center directors direct access to the Ad-
ministrator, but it stretched the span of con-
trol beyond what is generally regarded as rea-
sonable limits.
The fifth reorganization of the Headquarters-
Field Center relationship was carried out by
the next Administrator, James E. Beggs, who
reinstated the system in which the field Cen-
ters report in clusters to the program offices.
This configuration ran into some of the same
types of problems confronted in the past under
similar arrangements. Each of the Centers
worked for more than one program office. The
Centers felt that too little concern was given
by their respective program offices to the insti-
tutional health of the Centers. Center direc-
tors were not satisfied that the program offices
represented their interests in Headquarters
decision-making. Old refrains were being
heard again and another reorganization ap-
peared to be in the making.
Looking Inside Today's NASA
(Note: Although this article was written in
1985, some of the insights are applicable today.
-- Editor)
Today's NASA retains many of the same attri-
butes that have distinguished the agency since
its formation. Much of the management phi-
losophy developed in the agency's first ten
years and articulated by James Webb still
guides today's management. The basic organi-
zational structure, the high degree of auton-
omy accorded to the field Centers, and the
heavy reliance on contractors as the principal
agents to do the work still remain as impor-
tant features of the NASA modus operandi.
Perhaps most remarkable [as of 1985] is the
continuity of personnel. NASA has one of the
lowest turnover rates of any federal agency.
Most of NASA's highly skilled technical and
professional employees know that the excite-
ment and challenge of their jobs cannot be
matched elsewhere. Even though many of
NASA's senior staff have skills and talents
that are readily marketable in the more high-
ly paid private sector, they choose not to move.
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The negative side of this personnel profile is
the fact that many NASA employees now ap-
proaching retirement eligibilityare likely to
leave in a mass exodus over the next several
years. This problem iscompounded by a scar-
cityof potential leaders between the ages of 30
and 40 --a gap caused by low recruiting levels
in the cutback period of the 1970s. Recently,
however, NASA has had great success in re-
cruiting highly qualified college freshouts.
The NASA mission stillattracts topflight sci-
entists,engineers, and technicians.
Regardless of its recent success in attracting
quality personnel, NASA suffers today from
many of the same exigencies that afflict other
departments and agencies of the federal gov-
ernment. The environment for these federal
organizations has been severely damaged by
the anti-bureaucratic rhetoric so prominent in
recent political campaigns and the excessive
zeal of those seeking to gut the federal work-
force. Equally damaging has been the vast ar-
ray of rules and regulations, promulgated
largely in response to Congressional pres-
sures, that have resulted in tighter limits on
the ability of government managers to man-
age.
The vigor and vitality of NASA in its early
years came in large measure from the sense
within NASA that the agency was its own
master. Congress appropriated the money;
NASA executed the program. The manage-
ment of the agency was more than willing to
assume responsibility and accountability for
the expenditure of the public funds entrusted
toit.
Today's management climate is vastly differ-
ent from that of NASA's early years. Like oth-
er federal agencies, NASA finds itself under
the close scrutiny of numerous Congressional
committees, each with its own particular
agenda and priorities and each seeking infor-
mation in more and more detail. With such in-
formation the committees can carry out their
oversight function to the point of what often
appears as micro-management.
A major instrument of congressional oversight
is the General Accounting Office (GAO). Staff
of GAO, working with the greatly expanded
(some would say overblown) staff of the Con-
gressional committees, are constantly looking
over the shoulders of all federal managers. At
the same time, the central agencies of the ex-
ecutive branch -- the Office of Management
and Budget, the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, and the General Services Administra-
tion -- have imposed layer upon layer of regu-
lations resulting in increasingly centralized
management systems. As a result, managers
at all levels are forced to devote excessive
amounts of their time and energies to the fil-
ing of forms and writing of reports. In such ba-
sic areas as personnel, procurement, travel,
and budget management, managers find that
they have only limited freedom of action. Dur-
ing NASA's early days, decisions were made at
all levels of management on a timely basis,
but today's decision-making process moves
more slowly and ponderously. Whereas key
individuals or small groups took responsibility
for decisions in the past, today that responsi-
bility tends to be spread out among larger
groups or committees.6
An inevitable result of having so many watch-
dogs and so many centralized regulatory sys-
tems is inhibiting initiative and the willing-
ness to innovate or take risks. Instead of dele-
gating responsibility to lower levels, each lev-
el of management feels compelled to retain
tighter controls and more decision-making au-
thority. Thus NASA Headquarters program
offices exercise what the field Centers regard
as micro-management, and the working rela-
tionship between the two levels is strained. At
lower levels throughout the agency, managers
are diverted from their principal tasks by the
need to comply with the regulatory overload.
Despite these negative forces working against
good management, NASA stands out as one of
the best run agencies in the federal establish-
ment. The high standard of NASA perfor-
mance owes much to the innate drive of NASA
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personnel to strive for excellence. NASA's
workforce, by virtue of its high levels of educa-
tion, training, and motivation, represents an
elite corps. They take great personal pride in
their participation in a program which is so
highly visible and so much a symbol of Ameri-
can leadership in science and technology. The
continuing high level of job satisfaction in the
agency ties directly into the fast-paced techni-
cal challenges inherent in the lofty goals set
out in the NASA charter and the commitment
of space activities "to peaceful purposes for the
benefit of all mankind."
While much has remained constant in the
NASA physiognomy, significant change is un-
der way in the nature of NASA's mission. Un-
til the era of the Shuttle, that mission consist-
ed mainly of various scientific exploration and
technology development programs of limited
duration. As an R&D organization, NASA
was by nature devoid of any operational role.
The implicit prevailing assumption was that
once a space science mission had been accom-
plished, the results would be turned over to
the scientific community for investigation.
Likewise, in the aeronautics research area,
findings were turned over either to potential
commercial users or to the military establish-
ment. The Space Shuttle and the Space Sta-
tion, each being long-term operational enter-
prises, pose a new set of questions with respect
to the most appropriate institutional home.
The question of the best institutional base for
the Shuttle came up for discussion and analy-
sis as the development phase got under way.
In 1977, James Beggs, then Executive Vice
President of General Dynamics, chaired a pan-
el of the National Academy of Public Adminis-
tration that considered various organizational
alternatives for the Shuttle. The report of the
panel concluded that unless and until the eco-
nomics of the Shuttle provided a basis for at-
tracting private investment, the best organi-
zational alternative was to retain the Shuttle
in NASA.7
In the eight years since that study was con-
ducted, the prospects for turning the Shuttle
into a net revenue producer have changed for
the worse rather than for the better. Although
many in NASA would welcome an opportunity
to hand over the Shuttle to some other organi-
zation in order to refocus NASA on its tradi-
tional R&D tasks, there are no other appropri-
ate alternatives in sight.
Looking ahead to the point in the 1990s when
the Space Station is scheduled to become oper-
ational, it appears that a similar set of ques-
tions will arise. Indeed, for as long as one can
see clearly into the future, it seems that the
NASA mission will include, in addition to the
traditional time-limited R&D activities, a re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of operating
systems providing access to and a permanent
manned presence in space. Six field Centers
are now involved in the Space Station pro-
gram. Such major changes under way in the
mission of NASA will probably call for further
agency-wide organizational adjustment and
restructuring.
-- October 1985
Edited and excerpted from sections of NASA: The Vision
and the Reality by Erasmus H. Kloman. National Acad-
emy of Public Administration (GPO: 1986-491-574:
40015). Used with permission. *-
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Management and Budget Lessons
The Space Shuttle Program
by Humboldt C. Mandell, Jr., Ph.D
Johnson Space Center
After each major manned space program, the
Johnson Space Center has conducted research,
written histories, and analyzed management
methods to scrutinize the past for weaknesses
and mistakes that can be avoided in the fu-
ture. These efforts have had three results:
lo Some practices and weaknesses have
been influenced and changed.
Among specific lessons learned are the
need for extended program definition
phases, resistance to pressures to esti-
mate costs on the low side, incorpora-
tion of adequate cost reserves into the
planning process, accurate initial esti-
mates to provide program stability, and
the increased involvement of NASA
analysts in the prediction of program
budgets.
, Some problems have continued be-
cause the cultural acceptance of prac-
tices has made them difficult to modify.
For example, the lack of emphasis on
the "budget year" throughout the man-
ned space program contributed to budg-
etary problems, but the practices have
remained relatively unchanged from
the Apollo program up to the present
time.
. Some obvious problems are inherently a
part of government program manage-
ment systems and are beyond the ca-
pability of any agency to influence. An
example of this is the divided manage-
ment responsibility, which has been a
part of some large NASA programs,
compromising the unity of command.
In a political society, such compromises
are a way of life and cannot be easily
changed by the agency itself.
Some reform of the NASA budget process has
been called for by study groups, along with
closer coupling of the design and cost estimat-
ing processes, and improvement of perfor-
mance management/measurement systems.
Analysis of Previous Lessons Learned
In 1971, at the beginning of the Space Shuttle
Program, an extensive interview process was
conducted at Johnson Space Center to deter-
mine what management lessons had been
learned by the aerospace industry which
might help avoid problems in managing the
Space Shuttle development. A structured set
of interviews was conducted with senior man-
agers of teams from the highest technology
aeronautical programs then existing. These
included the SR-71 Strategic Reconnaissance
Aircraft of the United States Air Force (Cla-
rence "Kelly" Johnson, Program Manager,
Lockheed Aircraft Co.); the Boeing 700 series
of aircraft (George Schairer, Vice President,
R&D, Boeing Airplane Company); the B-58
(Robert Widmer, Vice President, General Dy-
namics/Ft. Worth), and numerous others.
Perhaps the most striking result of the activ-
ity was the general management consensus
concerning ways to reduce costs in govern-
ment programs, particularly when the find-
ings are compared to current NASA manage-
ment practices.
44
Management and Budget Lessons, The Space Shuttle Program
The study reached the somewhat subjective
conclusions that to reduce program costs,
NASA should:
1. State requirements as objectives, and
leave them relatively unconstrained.
. Not start building flight hardware until
all major technological uncertainties
have been resolved.
3. Utilize small, hand-picked government
program offices and contractor teams.
4. Eliminate (or greatly reduce)
government-imposed changes.
5. Allow contractors maximum autonomy.
. Once program definition has resolved
major technological uncertainties, com-
plete the development process as quick-
ly as possible.
NASA management agreed to try many of
these potential cost-saving cultural differ-
ences. However, the cultural inheritance, a
result of using many of the same management
and contractor teams from the Apollo pro-
gram, soon overcame many planning ambi-
tions. Except in a few notable areas, the origi-
nal culture was not appreciably changed, ex-
cept where it had to be adapted to survive the
newly cost-constrained environment.
These 1971 studies further concluded that pro-
gram cost estimates made within company en-
gineering departments are generally ade-
quate. However, since bidders usually under-
estimate costs to increase the likelihood of
winning hardware contracts, overruns often
occur. Research performed recently supports
this finding; in fact, professional cost estima-
tors have found that this buy-in effect has be-
come one of the major contemporary problems
of program cost analysis.
The 1971 studies observed that program con-
trol techniques similar to the DoD C/SCSC are
effective and essential, but excessive control
(or micro-management) is a deterrent to good
performance. And finally, and probably most
important to current and future programs, it
was found that concurrent development of mu-
tually dependent, high technology items is es-
pecially difficult unless strong unified man-
agement is provided.
Lessons Learned from Space Shuttle
Between 1977 and 1979 a series of studies was
performed as a result of budgetary problems
encountered in the peak funding years of the
Space Shuttle program. These studies univer-
sally found that although the technical aspects
of the program were being managed very well,
some management problems existed. For ex-
ample, the Day Committee, headed by LeRoy
E. Day, found that peak funding problems had
occurred as a result of almost universal inat-
tention to the "budget year"; i.e., two years
into the future. So much was the preoccupa-
tion with the current ("operating") year, that
little attention was paid to the budget year.
Often, contractor estimates were employed
with little analysis to predict the program re-
quirements. The Day Committee found that
this problem could have been avoided by inde-
pendent analysis of contractor estimates by
the government. The committee also found
that NASA in general did not apply enough
analytical manpower to programmatic, espe-
cially budgetary, tasks. (The results of the
studies were never published but are on file in
the JSC Cost Estimation Data Bank.)
Prior to his departure from NASA, a Space
Shuttle program manager was interviewed ex-
tensively to obtain his perspective on lessons
learned from the program, particularly in the
program management areas, including cost es-
timating and program control. He made the
following observations.
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If the "bottom line" of success is obtaining a
successful program result for the least
money, then the management systems
used were successful.
No amount of money early in the program
would have prevented the technical prob-
lems (the Space Shuttle Main Engine de-
velopment problems and the Thermal Pro-
tection System tile problems, primarily).
Ninety-five percent of the problems with
our budget system have nothing to do with
the mechanics of program control. They
are more related to the way we organize
and review our budget; pressures to be
over-optimistic in the budgeting process;
the interfaces we have with the Congress
and the Administration; and coming to
grips with problems we predict.
Over-optimism is popular, and the process
encourages it.
The budget cycle can be improved. Budget
calls probably should not dictate a sched-
ule: project personnel should be asked to
predict the schedules they can make and
the dollars they need to make them.
The prediction of program cost reserves
should receive more emphasis, at all levels
of the program. Program reviews should
solicit issues and create a climate for re-
solving budget problems, not only techni-
cal issues. Reviews should emphasize the
pedigree of cost and schedule estimates,
the degree of optimism or pessimism
(risk), and the likely program cost growth.
Reviews should reflect the best estimates
of cost reserves required for contingencies.
Program control should emphasize quanti-
tative measurement of progress, and focus
on future projections based on past perfor-
mance (e.g., manhours per foot of welds on
the External Tank).
Program Control and Management
Processes
A number of the factors influencing program
success were also explored in a survey submit-
ted to all senior managers of the Space Shuttle
Program. Program managers were asked to
rank management factors or processes which
favorably influenced the outcome of the pro-
gram. The most highly ranked items were:
. Actions of the program manager (e.g.,
timely decision-making, effective man-
agement leadership);
2. Adequacy of the original cost estimates;
, Actions of the program director (e.g.,
budget leadership, timely resolution of
program conflicts);
o NASA resource management processes
employed by the program manager's
staff; and
. NASA resource management processes
employed by the program director's
staff.
The three least effective influences (neutral,
slightly influential, or of negative influence)
on program success were found to be: annual
funding limitations by the OMB and Congress
(this is an example of an influence completely
outside the control of program management);
the Cost Limit Review Board (CLRB) (a NASA
Headquarters body that screened major
changes); and the performance manage-
mentJmeasurement system, which was ranked
so low as to indicate that it might have even
been counterproductive. At least, it was never
used effectively.
Program managers were also asked to sepa-
rately rank only the management processes
which had had the most influence on the suc-
cessful outcome of the program.
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The most highly regarded process was the in-
dependent assessment function performed by
the program office at JSC; second, the cost es-
timation process; third, the budgeting process
(despite its flaws); and fourth and least effec-
tive, the performance management/measure-
ment system employed.
A few other factors making major contribu-
tions to the favorable program cost outcome
were: early system definition and configura-
tion change control; change of program con-
tent (content was reduced at several points in
the program); contractor willingness to accept
risk; and good analogous data on which to base
cost estimates.
Many of the managers said that too much
management time was diverted from signifi-
cant problems by excessive budget-related
problems which occurred at the peak of the
program. Six actions were suggested:
1. End overly close alliances with contrac-
tors;
2. Allow projects to keep change reserves
within their budgets;
3. Plan the program to realistic resource
limits;
as total cost magnitudes can be a deterrent to
successfully selling the program in the politi-
cal environment.
Summary and Conclusions
Perhaps the major lesson to be learned from
this type of analysis is that it is extremely dif-
ficult, primarily for reasons of cultural inertia,
to change a management practice from one
program generation to the next. Lessons
learned are often either forgotten or not easily
incorporated into the management culture.
I shall not repeat here the conclusions of the
various studies mentioned above. However, I
will describe a pattern that has emerged over
two generations of analyses.
First, the program planning process has a
significant effect on the outcome of a program.
Programs with longer definition phases have
proven to have the least cost and schedule
overruns. Accurate initial budgets, provided
by accurate program cost estimates, have uni-
versally been cited as a requirement for suc-
cess. Accurate budgets have a stabilizing ef-
fect on the program; inaccurate budgets lead
to the spending of inordinate management and
other program resources on replanning, re-
scoping, recosting, and rescheduling activities.
4. Clarify the responsibilities of all pro-
gram levels early in the program;
5. Treat escalation realistically; and,
6. Accurately assess development time.
Management responses were far from unani-
mous on these influences, however. For exam-
ple, a former program director responded that
accurate cost estimates at the outset of a pro-
gram are often counterproductive, in that they
provide ammunition for the opponents of the
program. This lent further credibility to the
conclusion that program proponents often do
not want to know the true costs of a program,
Second, NASA has in the past not done the
best possible job of budgeting during the peak
years of a program, relying too heavily upon
contractor cost projections, and not providing
agency or program management with enough
resource reserve flexibility to respond to pro-
gram uncertainties. The NASA budget pro-
cess must be reformed to provide more inter-
nal NASA analysis and less reliance upon con-
tractor estimates. Far more emphasis on run-
out years is needed.
Third, there is enormous pressure at the be-
ginning of a program to estimate the actual
costs to be lower than historical trends might
indicate. Lower estimates simply increase
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the probability that the program will overrun
its costs. Program managers feel that they
will be able to do better than their predeces-
sors, and they are often willing to assume high
risk in initial program estimates to help sell
the program in the political arena.
Because hardware contracts are always com-
petitively awarded, the proposer must tread a
fine line between cost estimate credibility and
the risk of losing out to a competitor offering a
lower price. As David Novick, the father of
modern cost estimation, said in 1962, "The in-
centives to estimate low are much greater
than the penalties, if indeed there are penal-
ties." In the quickly changing NASA environ-
ment, the contractor knows that if indeed a
winning bid is too low, actual costs can be re-
covered through the acquisition process (usu-
ally cost-plus-fee), plus the cost of any changes
made.
Fourth, NASA has consistently used three
tiers of program offices, often large organiza-
tions with different points of view, despite evi-
dence that many of the most successful aero-
space programs have been effectively man-
aged by very small program offices.
NASA has evolved to a management style
which mixes government and private sector in
the technological decision-making processes.
This highly interactive style produces a tech-
nically superb product, but also causes an
enormous change workload that often results
in costly program changes. While a former
Space Shuttle program manager denies that
any nonessential changes were made, the pro-
cess is driven by thousands of detailed
changes, often stimulated by the NASA engi-
neering community itself (as opposed to a pro-
cess driven by broadly-stated program re-
quirements). This process has been assessed
by many senior program managers to be very
costly.
Performance management/meaurement sys-
tems previously used by NASA have consis-
tently been either ignored or blamed for not
revealing problems in time to resolve them.
Future systems should be designed to cope
with the unique requirements of a particular
program environment, as opposed to using sys-
tems from previous programs.
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THE 'MANAGERS' ONLINE SERVICE
(REVISED)
A current awareness service entitled MAN-
AGERS is available online through the
NASA/RECON system. Twenty citations and
abstracts of books, journal articles, and reports
are selected each week as those recent addi-
tions to the STI Database most likely to be of
particular interest to NASA managers. The
items included are updated every Monday
morning.
These items are selected for their timeliness
and pertinence to NASA's mission, manage-
ment, and foreign technology exchange. Use
of this service allows NASA managers and
other interested individuals to stay abreast of
new developments in a wide variety of subject
areas covering the interests of managers in
various fields.
Those who are interested in reviewing these
weekly selections may execute the
MANAGERS stored search from within File
Collections A, B, D, N, O, or P in
NASA/RECON. For those who do not have
individual RECON passwords, the service is
available through the local technical libraries
at all NASA Centers and many NASA
contractors, as well as through the libraries of
some other government agencies and their
contractors.
To see the selected citations and abstracts, the
reviewer can sign into RECON and follow
these steps:
STEP 1: Type BB A/E (press enter)
STEP 2: Type QUERY EXECUTE
MANAGERS (NAHQ) (press enter)
The system will respond: MANAGERS
EXECUTION BEGINS. This stored search
will then retrieve from the STI Database
those 20 accessions which are that week's
selections, and place them into Set 1. Once
execution is completed, the system will re-
spond: END SEQUENCE MANAGERS
EXECUTION.
STEP 3: Type DISPLAY 1 (press enter)
This allows review of the first citation in
the set. Subsequent citations may be
shown by typing DISPLAY and pressing
the enter key. (Dial-up users may also use
either the TYPE or BROWSE command in-
stead of DISPLAY.)
Some of the subject areas covered by the week-
ly service are:
Current aerospace technology on
present and future NASA space mis-
sions, including aerospace medicine.
Technologies of the European space pro-
gram as well as those of the U.S.S.R.
and Japan.
New management methods, business
trends, and policies concerning procure-
ment, financial, contract, personnel,
and research management.
Congressional and legislative reports,
federal budgets, and appropriations of
the NASA program.
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New developments in database man-
agement systems and software.
Current reports on international trade,
market research, and economics.
Current technology transfer, assess-
ments, and utilization.
Current reports on international rela-
tions, cooperation, and space law.
Some sample titles included in the
MANAGERS service have been:
The Three R's of Training: Recording,
Retaining, and Reporting -- the Train-
ing Management that Synergizes
The NASA Information Life-Cycle
Transition Management within the
Software Project
U.S.-Soviet Space Relationships in the
1990's -- A U.S. Perspective on Policy
Alternatives
• NASA's New University Engineering
Space Research Programs
• The Law and Regulation of Internation-
al Space Communication (book)
Copies of reports or articles found in MANAG-
ERS may be ordered from your local technical
library.
Citations entered weekly are among those in-
cluded in the annual publication Manage-
ment: A Bibliography for NASA Managers
(NASA SP-7500). For additional information,
contact RECON/Reference Services, (301)
621-0150.
BOOK REVIEWS
Effective Project Planning and Manage-
ment: Getting the Job Done, by W. Glen
Randolph and Barry Z. Posner, 1988.
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
A self-help book for project managers? After
eight years of leading seminars on effective
project planning and management, these two
professors with doctorates in business admin-
istration from University of Massachusetts
wrote this book for managers in the broadest
sense, from housekeepers to engineers. It be-
gins with a self-scoring inventory and ends
with inspirational advice to follow 10 simple
rules.
The "planning" section consists of a catchy
acronym for management by objectives: GO-
CARTS. First, set a clear Goal. Then deter-
mine your Objectives. Establish Checkpoints
(milestones), Activities (tasks), Relationships
(among activities) and Time estimates. The S
stands for Schedule, pictured in a bar or flow
chart. Simple enough, and the authors apply
the GO-CARTS to Noah's Ark, suggesting per-
haps a better way to get ready for The Flood.
The "managing" section consists of another
acronym: DRIVER. Direct people individ-
ually and as team members. Reinforce their
commitment and Inform everyone of every-
thing. Then build agreements (conflict resolu-
tion) that Vitalize team members, and Em-
power yourself and others with a greater sense
of purpose in the project. Finally, Rule 10, en-
courage Risk-taking (creativity).
The rules and acronyms may seem contrived
and overly simplistic, but the authors provide
several lively anecdotes, cartoons and even
comic strips.
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The Leadership Factor, by John P. Kotter,
1988. The Free Press, New York.
Armed with questionnaires, interviews and
case studies, Harvard Business School profes-
sor John Kotter identifies and validates four
consecutive factors that create outstanding
leadership: inborn capacity, early childhood
experiences, formal education and career ex-
periences. These factors seem to determine a
great leader's keen mind, strong interpersonal
skills, lofty integrity and high energy drives.
While such information is not exactly earth-
shaking, Kotter's observation -- based upon
empirical data -- is that "very few firms have
sufficient people with those skills and assets."
He describes this as an "increasingly serious
problem." Lee Iacocca is the only leader sin-
gled out, and Johnson & Johnson the only
management team that measures up to such
leadership standards. Most of the failures are
disguised by fictitious names.
To attract and keep better leaders, Kotter sug-
gests a sophisticated recruiting effort (not
based on "personnel" trivialities) to seek out
the leaders of tomorrow; an attractive ("fun")
work environment, free of games, politics and
bureaucracy; challenging, decentralized op-
portunities; systematic, early identification of
potential and development needs; and
planned, formal development opportunities.
The burden, he says, is on the shoulders of hu-
man resource professionals to look for and cul-
tivate those who show innate and earned lead-
ership potential, instead of being technically
competent.
Thus, The Leadership Factor is more global
and analytical than practical, a follow-on to
his more popular The General Managers
(1982) and Power and Influence (1985).
Kelly Johnson, perhaps the most honored
aeronautical engineer alive today, is best
known for his "Skunk Works" at Lockheed --
an innovative project management concept
that produced the U-2 and SR-71 "Black Bird"
on schedule and under budget.
More Than My Share is the personal reflection
of Kelly Johnson, edited by Maggie Smith.
The seventh of nine children of a stern but not
severe Swedish bricklayer who took the wrong
train to Nebraska and ended up in Wisconsin,
Kelly invented his nickname in grammar
school after busting the leg of the school bully
who called him "Clara." "Kelly", taken from
an Irish fighting song popular at the time,
stuck.
'_I have known what I wanted to do since I was
12," recalls Kelly. But to get an aeronautical
engineering degree at the University of Michi-
gan during the Depression, he had to study
civil, chemical, electrical and mechanical en-
gineering -- "an excellent curriculum because
it provided a very good basic education in ev-
erything it took to design and build an air-
plane," he recalls. He had only two dates in
college and had to feed an ulcer with dough-
nuts and milk constantly. Unable to find a job
after graduation, and with eyesight too poor
for the Army Air Corps, Kelly returned to Ann
Arbor for graduate study in aerodynamics un-
til he was hired by Lockheed for $83 a month
in 1933.
During that time Kelly proved his aeronauti-
cal expertise, and was sought out by Amelia
Earhart, Howard Hughes, and the Lindbergs.
With Anne Lindberg's approval, he fashioned
his guiding principles of life: belief in God,
good health, purpose in life, a spouse who loves
and understands you, and respect for superiors
and subordinates.
Kelly: More Than My Share of It All, by
Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson, 1985. The
Smithsonian Press, Washington, D. C.
Ten years later, Kelly promised the Army Air
Corps that Lockheed would build, in 180 days,
a match for the jet-powered Messerschmitt
262. But Lockheed was booked up, already
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running three shifts six days a week for the
war effort. Kelly, given a free rein, "stole" 22
trusted Lockheed engineers from the main fac-
tory, and retrofitted an old machine shop with
spares, scrap lumber and a rented circus tent.
The YP-80A, the nation's first tactical jet
fighter, also the first to break 500 mph, was
accepted by the Air Corps 143 days later. His
secret, ragtag, makeshift, independent opera-
tion was known as "Skunk Works", reminis-
cent of Li'l Abner's kickapoo joy juice, a hasty
brew that included skunks.
Chapter 16, "It's No Secret," is chock full of
management techniques used in the dozen or
so "Skunk Works" operations Kelly conducted.
Early on at Lockheed he learned two lessons
from chief engineer Hale Hibbard which con-
tributed to the success of "Skunk Works": ex-
cellent labor relations, and "it is much better
to lead people, not to drive them." He also be-
lieved that those who design aircraft should
also fly them, and Kelly insisted on inviting
employee families to aircraft christenings. He
carried quarters around with him for anyone
who could prove him wrong on anything.
Throughout the years, Kelly's first two wives
suffered and died. Recently he was funding a
hospice at a Burbank hospital for family mem-
bers, and because "life is too short," he mar-
ried Nancy Johnson. "The final chapter of my
life is not yet written," Kelly concludes. "But
if God should call me tonight, I will have had
more than my share of it..."
ment theory as applied to engineering, skill in
linear programming, and the "values and aspi-
rations" in the attitudes of an engineering
manager.
While the 469-page book does not deal with fi-
nances nor economics, it does attempt to quan-
tify the subjective values of decision-making.
A "hierarchical decision model" in the appen-
dix pulls together much of the probability the-
ory of earlier chapters for use in project plan-
ning, evaluation and resource allocations. The
book winds down with environmental con-
cerns and legal implications of engineering
management.
Cleland had authored a standard textbook ear-
lier, called Systems Analysis and Prqiect Man-
agement, and later co-edited the Prqiect Man-
agement Handbook (reviewed in NASA SP-
6101). Kocaoglu used a systems approach in
his 1976 doctoral dissertation at Pitt. Here,
however, the emphasis is not on systems anal-
ysis but rather upon engineering. The engi-
neer who has little knowledge of management
will find more of interest than the manager
with little skill in engineering. Using the
mathematical models of engineering, the tech-
nical specialist is introduced to management
responsibilities.
Engineering Management is a bit dated but
useful as a graduate-level textbook and as an
orientation for engineers who find themselves
as managers of projects and people.
Engineering Management, by David I. Cle-
land and Dundar F. Kocaoglu, 1981. McGraw-
Hill, New York.
Believing "the time has come" for engineering
management to be recognized as a distinct dis-
cipline, the two founders of the U. of Pitts-
burgh's engineering management program set
out to define, describe and explain what engi-
neers need to know when they become manag-
ers. To do this, they concentrate on manage-
The Implementation of Project Manage-
ment: The Professional's Handbook, ed-
ited by Linn C. Struckenbruck, 1987.
Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass.
The Southern California chapter of the Project
Management Institute spent two years pro-
ducing this how-to manual for executives who
find themselves in the role of project manage-
ment. Dr. Linn Struckenbruck, professor of
safety and systems management at USC,
E
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served as coordinator and provided about half
the material in this oversize (9 by 12) hand-
book.
"This book will discuss the methods and proce-
dures used by successful project managers,
and will point out the pitfalls to be avoided in
implementing a project," the editor proclaims
at the outset. The project manager is an ex-
ecutive who assumes an additional role -- inte-
gration -- and becomes ultimately responsible
for a large, well-defined but complex project.
Hence, the emphasis here is upon the matrix.
Matrix is defined as a dual-authority relation-
ship between the project manager and the
functional line manager. The balance of pow-
er is in the hands of the former in a tight or
strong matrix and with the latter in a weak or
loose matrix organization. The ideal is either
a balance of power by dividing the responsibil-
ities into overall integration and technical di-
rection, or to shift the balance depending on
budget and schedule. In either case, top man-
agement support of the matrix concept is fun-
damental.
More traditional management theories are
presented, such as management by objectives
(MBO). Fred Peters, chief of programs, sched-
uling and analysis at Johnson Space Center,
co-authors one chapter on MBO in project
management. MBO is described as an empha-
sis on results instead of activities in a goal-
oriented project. Yet even the MBO can be in-
corporated into a matrix when the project
manager obtains specific objectives in writing
from functional personnel as a way of firming
up positive commitments. These concrete ob-
jectives then become useful yardsticks in per-
formance evaluation. Pitfalls are listed, but if
the objectives are achievable and verifiable,
MBO can be a useful tool, for the project man-
ager, even in a matrix organization.
Eight appendices with sample charts add to
the value of this handbook. While style and
approach vary among the dozen or so writers,
with considerable overlap, The Implementa-
tion of Project Management is quite readable.
Three case histories in the back show applied
theory and underscore the lessons learned.
Management: A Bibliography for NASA
Managers (NASA SP-7500)
Scientific and Technical Information Division,
annual. This bibliography is a collection of re-
ferences selected from the unclassified reports
and journal articles announced in the NASA
STI Database. The references are selected
based on their timeliness and pertinence to
NASA's mission, management and foreign
technology exchange. The items are grouped
into 10 categories, especially chosen for this
bibliography, ranging from Human Factors
and Personnel Issues to Management Theory
and Techniques. Seven indexes are included:
subject, personal author, corporate source, for-
eign technology, contract number, report num-
ber, and accession number. Available from
the National Technical Information Service.
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